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Abstract
Security is one of the major design criteria for modern computing system. Computing
systems are becoming more compact and connected day by day.

Due to the large

scale connectivity, various security threats are causing failure to confidentiality, integrity,
availability and many other basic security criteria.

On the other hand, the compact

devices used in the embedded computing systems can hardly afford resource hungry security
techniques. As improvements in conventional technologies has almost come to a saturation,
many emerging technologies are drawing researcher’s attention in this regard. This work
proposes design techniques using emerging technologies in order to find more comprehensive
security solutions for embedded computing system. Two major part of conventional VonNeuman or Harvard architectures are memory and processing unit which requires individual
attention for security against various threats. Chaotic oscillator based logic and RRAM
based memory design are explored in this work to mitigate different existing security
vulnerabilities with significantly lower overhead. Proposed design techniques are applied
in a RISC-V microarchitecture to ensure memory integrity and enhance the security against
unauthorized code execution and instruction reverse-engineering based on side channel power
attack. Security of the proposed design techniques are found to be at the desired level while
consuming a very low overhead as compared to existing mitigation techniques against the
same set of vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security is a required design criteria in modern computing system. Security threats are
expanding in a similar pace with the advancements in computing technologies. A computing
system is vulnerable to various threats in both of its production and consumption phases.
Reverse engineering, hardware trojan insertion, counterfeiting etc. are some of the security
concerns for computing hardwares while being manufactured in outsourced and untrusted
fabrication facilities [49]. There are also numerous ways a computing system can be attacked
in its usage phase leveraging both hardware and software related vulnerabilities. Security
aware designs are therefore necessary to minimize the vulnerabilities.

1.1

Motivation

Secure computing starts with the security of underlying computer architecture. Traditional
security solutions often require high implementation cost. Specially, an embedded computing
system cannot afford such solutions due to limited resources. Besides, most of the solutions
are very specific to a particular vulnerability. More comprehensive solutions within the cost
budget are required in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities.
Emerging technologies are being explored by the researchers to design more efficient
computing systems [2]. Emerging technologies bring more opportunities to solve existing
design problems within limited resource. However, security applications of these technologies
have not been explored much yet. In this work, two emerging technologies, chaos computing
1

and memristive memory have been explored in order to find more comprehensive security
solutions for computer architecture [71, 15, 16, 57, 93].
Chaos computing is an unconventional method for computing where a chaotic oscillator
can be used for computation. A chaotic oscillator governed by nonlinear dynamics generates
large number of patterns which are sensitive to initial condition. Reconfigurable Boolean
functions can be implemented using chaotic oscillators. Reconfigurability from chaos logic
is not only limited to having different functionalities from a single device. Rather, each
function itself is reconfigurable in such a way that each configuration causes unique physical
characteristics such as power consumption, delay etc. Another aspect of the chaos computing
is that minor process variations cause significant differences in device to device behaviors
due to chaotic evolution. All these features can be leveraged in designing a secure computer
processor capable of mitigating various security threats and can be applied in embedded
systems with low resource budgets.
Designing secure memory is another important part of secure computer architecture. In
this work, memristive memory has been explored to design a memory with an integrated
integrity checking scheme. In a typical integrity checking method, a tag is generated from
memory data during each write operation and saved. During the next read operation,
the tag is regenerated and compared with the last saved tag. Any mismatch between
the two tags indicates an alteration in the memory data. Conventionally, an external tag
generating module is used to generate tag from the memory data which often requires high
overhead in terms of area, power consumption, delay and prohibitive for embedded system
applications. In this work, an integrity checking method has been developed based on the
Resistive Random Access Memory (RRAM) where the memory itself can be used as the
tag generating function. This tag generation method leverages the sneak path currents in a
crossbar RRAM. Sneak path currents refer to the current flow in the unselected cells in a
crossbar architecture of passive circuit elements. Due to the sneak paths, current flow in a
read operation is dependent on each cell in the memory which can be leveraged to generate
a tag for the memory data. However, sneak path currents affect the reliability of regular
read and write operations. In order to mitigate this problem, 1T1R structure is considered
for the RRAM where sneak path currents can be controlled using the transistor of each cell.
2

1.2

Research Goals

This work aims at providing more comprehensive security solution to traditional computing
architecture for embedded system using emerging technologies. Two major parts in VonNeuman or Harvard computer architectures are the memory and processing unit. The work
is organized into two major parts: i) designing a secure memory using crossbar RRAM ii)
designing a secure processing unit using chaos logic. These designs are applied in a RISC-V
microarchitecture in order to develop a security enhanced embedded computer.
The goal of the secure memory design work is to design a memory having an integrated
integrity checking protocol. 1T1R memristive crossbar array is considered as the memory
technology for this work. The main part of the integrity checking protocol of this work is
the tag generation method. Tag is computed from the memory data by using sneak path
currents in the memristive crossbar array. Generated tag needs to meet certain statistical
properties for ensuring the security of the integrity checking protocol. An analytical model
of the tag generation is developed in order to guide a designer to find appropriate design
parameters meeting the security goals.
Second part of this dissertation is designing a secure processing unit using chaos based
reconfigurable logic gates. Chaos logic gates are developed using the state-of-the-art chaos
computing research.

Chaos logic can be reconfigured into different Boolean functions

depending on certain control parameters named as chaos configurations. The same function
can be realized using different chaos configurations. Each of these configurations in the
chaos gate results in different physical characteristics (power, delay) from each other. An
obfuscated arithmetic logic unit (ALU) is designed using chaos logic gates where each copy
of the device uses a unique chaos configuration. The resiliency of this design against side
channel power template attack is analyzed in this work. Power templates built from the
instructions of an ALU can not be used successfully to classify the instructions of an ALU
on another chip because each chip exhibits unique power profile for each instruction due to
the process variation and differences in configurations. Different classification algorithms are
used in order to demonstrate the attack on the chaos based ALU design.
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The design of the secure memory unit and the arithmetic logic unit is incorporated
in a RISC-V microarchitecture in order to design a logic obfuscated processor which can
verify memory integrity in an efficient way and provides security against unauthorized code
execution and side channel power template attacks.

1.3

Dissertation Overview

The dissertation is organized as follow. Chapter 2 provides relevant backgrounds on the
RRAM memory and chaos based logic technology. Design of an RRAM based secure memory
unit with an integrated integrity verification protocol is described in Chapter 3. Chapter
4 describes the chaos based reconfigurable logic design methodology and its application in
design obfuscation. Design obfuscation in this section involves both functionality and power
traces of ALU instructions. Implementation of a secure RISC-V microarchitecture using the
RRAM memory and chaos logic based processing unit is presented in Chapter 5. Finally,
the dissertation is summarized along with some future prospects of the work in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background
Designing embedded computers are challenging due to the constraints in resources. Besides,
embedded computing systems are connected to large scale networks with sensors, other
computing devices and various output devices. Due to large scale connectivity, an embedded
computer is vulnerable to a large number of security vulnerabilities. Adversaries target both
memory and processing unit which are the two basic parts of traditional Von-Neuman or
Harvard computer architectures (Fig. 2.1) used in embedded computing. Existing mitigation
techniques require significant amount of resources. They are also very specific to mitigating a
particular type of vulnerability. In this dissertation, unconventional design techniques using
emerging technologies are applied for designing an embedded computer in order to enhance
security against several attacks with significantly lower overhead.

Figure 2.1: Traditional computer architectures.
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A microarchitecture with enhanced security features for embedded computing platform
is developed in this work. The microarchitecture is designed for a RISC-V instruction set
[80, 28, 47]. Security enhancing measures for the design of memory and processing unit are
applied to the developed microarchitecture. The RRAM technology is used for the design
of memory. The processing unit is secured by applying chaos computing technology. In this
chapter, necessary backgrounds are provided on RISC-V instruction set, vulnerabilities in
memory and processing units of an embedded computer, RRAM and chaos computing.

2.1

RISC-V

RISC-V is an open source instruction set architecture (ISA) developed at The University
of California, Berkeley for computer architecture research. RISC-V ISA is built using the
basic features of reduced instruction set computer (RISC). It has a significant impact on
the computer architecture research as there have been very few open source instruction
sets earlier. Researchers from a variety of computing platforms use RISC-V and explore
new opportunities to the existing computer architectures. RISC-V is being widely used in
research toward lightweight and resource constrained computing in the embedded systems
and IoT edge devices [80, 28, 47, 30, 46].
RISC-V is very flexible for a variety of microarchitectural implementations in different
hardware platforms such as fully custom, ASIC, FPGA [30, 46]. The RISC-V ISA has
multiple extensions to the base instruction sets. In addition, base instruction sets have
different variants for 32, 64 and 128 bit which represents the width of the data registers.
There are 2 base sets for 32 bits known as RV32I and RV32E. RV32I is the base set for integer
instructions. RV32E is the same as the RV32I except for the number of registers supported.
RV32E is used mainly for embedded applications. RV32I supports 32 registers where RV32E
causes an illegal instruction exception if the register number is chosen between 16 and 31.
32 and 64 bit base instruction sets of RISC-V are known as RV32I and RV64I, respectively.
Along with the base integer instructions, it also supports single, double and quad precision
floating points with ’F‘, ’D‘ and ’Q‘, respectively. Decimal floating points are supported
with the ’L‘ extension. Multiplication/division has been excluded from the base set which
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is supported with the ’M‘ extension. There are several other extensions named as ’A‘, ’C‘,
’B‘, ’J‘, ’T‘, ’P‘ ’V‘ and ’N‘ which supports atomic instructions, compressed instructions,
bit manipulation, dynamically translated languages, transactional memory, packed-SIMD
instructions, vector operations and user level interrupts, respectively. Parallel computing
structures with multi cores are supported by the RISC-V. This work focuses on embedded
computing for which the RV32E ISA is recommended [84]. However since the RV32I is same
as the RV32E except for the register file size, here only the RV32I base instruction set is
described.

2.1.1

RV32I

There are 4 core instruction formats in the RV32I base ISA [84]. The instructions are
categorized as R-type, I-type, S-type and U-type. In addition to these 4 core types, there
are two more variants for the instruction formats, B and J type based on the structure of the
immediate data field. The instruction format is given in the Table 2.1. Detailed user level
instruction set with the opcode and extended opcode (funct3, funct7) values are listed in
Table 2.2. R-type instructions perform operation on the operands corresponding to the data
of two source registers, rs1 and rs2. The result of the operation is loaded into the destination
register, rd. The I-type instructions are very similar to the R-types except that one of the
operands is a constant and comes from the 12-bit long immediate field of the instruction.
Control transfer instructions are of several types. Unconditional jump instructions JAL
and JALR uses the J-type and I-type instruction encoding. The JAL instruction executes
unconditional jump operation by loading the target address to the program counter used as
the address of the instruction memory. The JALR instruction causes a program to jump
Table 2.1: Instruction format of RV32I instruction set [84].
[31:25]
[24:20] [19:15] [14:12]
[11:7]
[6:0]
funct7
rs2
rs1
funct3
rd
opcode
imm[11:0]
rs1
func3
rd
opcode
imm[11:5]
rs2
rs1
funct3
imm[4:0]
opcode
imm[12][10:5]
rs2
rs1
funct3 imm[4:1][11] opcode
imm[31:12]
rd
opcode
imm[20k10 : 1k11k19 : 12]
rd
opcode
7

Type
R
I
S
B
U
J

Table 2.2: User level instruction subset of RV 32I [84].
Instruction
LUI
AUIPC
JAL
JALR
BEQ
BNE
BLT
BGE
BLTU
BGEU
LB
LH
LW
LBU
LHU
SB
SH
SW
ADDI
SLTI
SLTIU
XORI
ORI
ANDI
SLLI
SRLI
SRAI
ADD
SUB
SLL
SLT
SLTU
XOR
SRL
SRA
OR
AND

31:25

24:20 19:15
imm[31:12]
imm[31:12]
imm[20k10 : 1k11k19 : 12]
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[12k10 : 5]
rs2
rs1
imm[12k10 : 5]
rs2
rs1
imm[12k10 : 5]
rs2
rs1
imm[12k10 : 5]
rs2
rs1
imm[12k10 : 5]
rs2
rs1
imm[12k10 : 5]
rs2
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:5]
rs2
rs1
imm[11:5]
rs2
rs1
imm[11:5]
rs2
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
imm[11:0]
rs1
0000000
shamt rs1
0000000
shamt rs1
0100000
shamt rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0100000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0100000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
0000000
rs2
rs1
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14:12

000
000
001
100
101
110
111
000
001
010
100
101
000
001
010
000
010
011
100
110
111
001
101
101
000
000
001
010
011
100
101
101
110
111

11:7
rd
rd
rd
rd
imm[4:1k11]
imm[4:1k11]
imm[4:1k11]
imm[4:1k11]
imm[4:1k11]
imm[4:1k11]
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
imm[4:0]
imm[4:0]
imm[4:0]
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd
rd

6:0
0110111
0010111
1101111
1100111
1100011
1100011
1100011
1100011
1100011
1100011
0000011
0000011
0000011
0000011
0000011
0100011
0100011
0100011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0010011
0110011
0110011
0110011
0110011
0110011
0110011
0110011
0110011
1100011
1100011

to the called procedure (subroutine) and saves the address of the next instruction to the
destination register, rd.
Conditional branch instructions follow the B-type encoding. B-type instructions compare
between two source registers, rs1 and rs2. The target address is calculated by adding the
offset from the immediate field to the current program counter value. The program counter
loads the target address value if the branch condition is found to be true.
Memory instructions are categorized into load and store instructions. Load and store
instructions are used for the memory read and write operations, respectively.

Load

instructions follow the I-type encoding. The memory address for loading the data from
is calculated by adding an offset with the source register, rs1. On the other hand, store
instructions have a S-type format where the address for the memory is the addition of the
source register, rs1 and the offset while the data to be written is in the source register, rs2.
There are several other instructions in the RV32I which require privileged access as listed
in Table 2.3. Control and status register (CSR) instructions are a privileged instruction type
which follows the I-type encoding. The immediate field of the I-type format are used as
the CSR number in this type of instructions. RV32I also provides some timer instructions
such as rdcycle, rdtime and rdinstret which are associated with execution time programs in
terms of number of cycle, absolute time etc. ECALL and EBREAK are two other privileged
instructions used for communicating with the operating system. For multi core operations,
Table 2.3: Privileged instruction subset of RV32I [84].
[31:28]
[27:24] [24:20] [19:15] [14:12] [11:7] [6:0] Instruction
FENCE
0000
pred
succ
00000
000 00000
0001111
FENCE,I
0000
0000
0000
00000
001 00000
0001111
ECALL
000000000000
00000
000 00000
1110011
EBREAK
000000000001
00000
000 00000
1110011
CSRRW
csr
rs1
001
rd
1110011
CSRRS
csr
rs1
010
rd
1110011
CSRRC
csr
rs1
011
rd
1110011
CSRRWI
csr
zimm
101
rd
1110011
CSRRSI
csr
zimm
110
rd
1110011
CSRRCI
csr
zimm
111
rd
1110011
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RV32I supports FENCE instructions in order to manage scheduling the memory and I/O
access by different processing cores.
The goal of this work is to augment the security of a RISC-V embedded processor by
applying lightweight and comprehensive security solutions to the design of memory and
processing units. An RRAM technology is chosen for the secure memory design for the
work and chaos based logic design is used in the design of secure processing unit. Necessary
backgrounds for RRAM and chaos computing are provided here.

2.2
2.2.1

Relevant Attacks and Existing Mitigations
Attack on Memory

Memory is one of the major parts of a conventional computer architecture. A computer
program uses memory access instructions such as load/store quite frequently. Security of
a program execution largely depends on the integrity of memory data. There are various
ways a memory can be subject to unauthorized modification both in runtime and offline.
Runtime attacks are usually software based attacks where memory is manipulated by a
malicious program. Low level programming languages such as C/C++ facilitate direct
memory manipulation which allows an evil software to cause unauthorized modification
to the memory. Stack overflow is such an attack where data is stored into the memory
for a number of times that adjacent memory segment that contains sensitive information
is overwritten [13]. Direct memory access (DMA) is another runtime memory attack [66].
DMA is a feature found in modern computers that enables some special peripherals to access
the memory, bypassing the operating system’s supervision. DMA helps faster processing by
enabling an I/O to communicate directly with the memory while the processor can perform
other tasks. However, this feature can be leveraged to attack a memory with unauthorized
modification.
Memory can also be attacked offline which refers to modifying memory content while
the memory is not interacting with the legitimate processor. Evil Maid attack is a relevant
example where an adversary attacks a powered off computer [74]. In this attack, the boot
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loader program stored in the non-volatile main memory is modified maliciously using an
external device. The objective of this attack is to gain sensitive information from the
login attempt of the authorized user using the compromised boot loader. This attack is
analogous to an event where an adversary is in the disguise of a maid enters a hotel room
and manipulates the boot loader program of the unattended computer left by the guest.

2.2.2

Mitigation Techniques for Memory Attack

General strategy for integrity checking is to generate a tag for the data to be stored in
the memory as shown in the Fig. 2.2. Integrity of the data is verified during the read
operation by comparing the regenerated tag with the saved one. Tag is a compressed
representation of an arbitrary sized data which is usually based on cryptographic hash
function, message authentication code (MAC) or block ciphers [61, 27, 32, 52, 21, 94, 73]. In
order to avoid overwhelming implementation cost associated with the tag generation using
standard crypto primitives, more lightweight approaches have been proposed for resource
constrained applications [33, 51].

2.2.3

Attack on Embedded Processor

Computer processors are subject to a variety of attacks. Leveraging seemingly inevitable loop
holes of the underlying architectures, an adversary can run malicious programs on a target
machine which can affect all of the system components connected to the processor. Specially,
when it is an embedded system, there are a very large number of sensitive components.
Unauthorized code execution can affect confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
information associated with these components in an embedded system. Return oriented
programming (ROP) is leveraged by an attacker in order to take control of the instruction
pointer and execute arbitrary codes on a processor [35, 68]. There are also Use-after-Free
attacks where a freed memory is accessed in order to crash a program or execute an arbitrary
code [76].
Side channel attacks are another type of attacks exploiting hardware specific implementation loop holes of software. Machine codes of an embedded processor can be reverse
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Figure 2.2: Existing mechanisms used for memory integrity verification [21].
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engineered by using common side channel characteristics such as power, electro-magnetic
emanation, timing information etc [63, 82, 69]. For power analysis based instruction reverse
engineering, various machine learning classification methods are used on pre-collected power
profiles for known instructions. Based on the classification algorithms and training power
profiles, nearly 100% instructions of a micro-controller can be recognized [63].

2.2.4

Existing Mitigation Techniques

There are various defense mechanisms on different abstraction levels against the security
vulnerabilities of an embedded processor. Architectural level mitigation techniques can
prevent such attacks to some extent [85, 67]. However, these mitigation techniques are very
specific to a particular implementation. Reconfigurable micro-architectures are proposed
to secure a processor from a lower abstraction level [50, 49]. In this method, computing
hardwares are logic encrypted using reconfigurable LUT. Executing a code on this platform
requires the valid configuration information.
There are also separate defense mechanisms for countering the side channel power attacks.
Hiding, masking intermediate values are very common approaches to mitigating different
kinds of power analysis attacks. Dynamic logic circuits such as dual rail pre-charge logic,
sense amplifier based logic (SABL) etc. can be used in hardware design to mitigate power
analysis based attacks [53].

2.3

Emerging Technologies for Secure Computing

Techniques for mitigating attacks on an embedded computer described above exhibits
significant amount of resource overheads in terms of power, area and delay. In addition, all
these mitigation techniques are very specific to mitigating a particular type of vulnerability.
Opportunities in the emerging technologies such as RRAM, chaos computing are explored in
this work in order to find more comprehensive security solutions for an embedded processor.
Relevant backgrounds for these two technologies are provided in this section.
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2.3.1

Resistive Random Access Memory (RRAM)

RRAM is one of the prominent emerging memory technologies. In an RRAM, information
is stored as a form of device resistance. Stored information in an RRAM is therefore nonvolatile which makes it an attractive candidate for computer memory. The term RRAM is
interchangeably used to refer a device called “memristor” [9]. Memristor is an abbreviated
form of memory resistor. In order to form an RRAM array, memristors are placed simply
between each cross-point of vertical and horizontal metal lines. RRAM thus has the potential
to form a high density memory array. Besides, RRAM technology is compatible with the
CMOS which keeps it a realistic choice from the perspective of fabrication cost. This section
provides some background on memristor, memristor models and RRAM array structures.
Memristor Device Operation
Memristor is a resistive switching device. Metal-insulator-metal (MIM) device stacks usually
exhibit property expected from a memristive device. Metal oxide memristors such as T iO2
or Hf O2 based devices require a filament formation between the two metal layers in order
to operate as a switching device. Before the filament formation, the resistance of the device
is at a high state governed by the oxide materials. A high bias voltage is required in order
to form the filaments. After the filament formation, a memristor can be switched between a
high resistance state (HRS) and low resistance state (LRS) by applying appropriate voltage
pulse. Current voltage relation of a memristor can be expressed as:
v(t) = i(t)M (t) =

dφ
i(t),
dq

(2.1)

where M (t) is the memristance i.e. the instantaneous resistance of the memristor, q(t) and
φ(t) are the charge and flux linkage, respectively. Flux linkage, φ(t) and charge, q(t) can
also be represented as the time integral of voltage and current, respectively:
Z

t

φ(t) =

v(τ )dτ,
−∞
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(2.2)

Z

t

i(τ )dτ.

q(t) =

(2.3)

−∞

A typical memristor switches by using voltage pulse of a specific magnitude, polarity and
pulse width. For a uni-polar memristor, pulse magnitudes required for switching are different
while having the same polarity [58]. On the other hand, for switching a bipolar memristor,
voltage pulse of the opposite polarity needs to be applied. The HRS and LRS are encoded
as the binary data ’0’ and ’1’, respectively. The resistive state of a memristor can be read
out as binary data by applying a small non destructive voltage and using a sense amplifier.
Memristor Model
Memristors are basically metal oxide switching devices which has the metal-insulator-metal
(MIM) structure [29], [77], [9]. Various transition metal oxides are used as the insulating
layer in these devices. Several models have been reported for memristor’s operation. The
HP lab proposed a model based on the ionic drift of oxygen vacancies in T iO2 memristive
devices [79]. The conceptual device structure considered for this model is shown in Fig. 2.3.
The oxide layer can be considered as a combination of doped and undoped region based on
the amount oxygen vacancies. The doped and undoped regions have different resistances.
The width of the doped region changes with the amount of applied bias. I-V characteristics
of such devices can be expressed as follows:
v(t) = (RON

w(t)
w(t)
+ ROF F (1 −
))i(t),
D
D

(2.4)

where D is the thickness of the oxide layer, w(t) is the width of the doped region, RON and
ROF F represents the resistance of the doped and undoped regions, respectively.
Mc. Donald et.al. proposed a model for Hf O2 memristors [60]. This model predicts the
instantaneous rate of memristance change with respect to the applied voltage as governed
by Eq. 2.5 and 2.6. For a positive bias, instantaneous memristance change is as follows:
M (ti+1 ) = M (ti ) −
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∆r∆tV (ti+1 )
,
tswp Vp

(2.5)

Figure 2.3: Memristor device structure considered for Ionic Drift Model proposed by HP lab
[79].
whereas for a negative bias, the memristance is updated by:
M (ti+1 ) = M (ti ) +

∆r∆tV (ti+1 )
.
tswn Vn

(2.6)

In the above equations, M is the memristance, ∆r represents the difference between LRS
and HRS, ∆t is the simulator step size, Vp and Vn are positive and negative thresholds,
respectively, tswp and tswn are the minimum switching time for low to high and high to low
switching, respectively. An improved model for the Hf O2 memristors given in Eq. 2.7 have
been proposed in [3] which considers resistance saturation and nonlinear resistance change
with the applied bias.


−CLRS ( V (t)−Vtp )PLRS fLRS (M (t)),

V (t) > Vtp
dM
Vtp
=

dt
−CHRS ( V (t)−Vtn )PHRS fHRS (M (t)), V (t) < Vtn
Vtn
The term

∆r
tswp

(2.7)

( t∆r
) of Eq. 2.5 and 2.6, respectively are considered in the term CLRS and
swn

(CHRS ) of Eq. 2.7. Window function, f for fitting the model to experimental data is as
follows:

f (M (t)) =









1
M (t)−θHRS HRS
βHRS ∆r
1+e

1

, V (t) < Vtn

θLRS LRS−M (t) ,

1+e

βLRS ∆r

where, θ and β are fitting parameters.
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(2.8)
V (t) > Vtp

RRAM Crossbar Array
RRAM crossbar array is a high density nanoelectronic structure where RRAM cells are
placed at the cross points of horizontal and vertical metal lines. A typical crossbar structure
is shown in Fig. 2.4. A memory cell is addressed by decoding a row and column line. In order
to set a memory cell to LRS (logic 1), a positive bias greater than a particular threshold is
applied. Similarly, a negative bias is applied for resetting the memory cell to HRS (logic 0).
For read operation, a small non-destructive voltage is applied across the selected memory
cell and the current is sensed using a sense amplifier to determine the stored data.
RRAM crossbars suffer from the current leakage through the unselected cells. Leakage
currents through unselected cells are well known as sneak path currents. Unlike a transistor,
there is no selector (gate) terminal that can control the current flow through the device.
Therefore, an applied bias across a selected memory cell also causes current flow in the
paths consisting of unselected cells. Current flow in the sneak path of a RRAM crossbar
is shown in Fig. 2.5. Sneak path currents cause write disturbances in a crossbar RRAM.
Different writing schemes have been proposed for mitigating the write disturbances caused
by the sneak path currents [8, 91]. These schemes mainly focus on the biasing of selected
and unselected lines in the crossbar in such a way that minimizes the impact of sneak path
currents. Sneak path currents also affect the read operation. Due to the sneak paths, read
current is contributed by the selected memory cell as well as unselected cells. Contribution
of the unselected cells to the read current becomes overwhelming with the increase of the
array size [55]. Reliability of read operation is therefore highly affected by the sneak path
currents.
Different array structures have been proposed in order to mitigate the sneak path
problems in a crossbar RRAM array [58]. The most popular idea for minimizing the effect
of sneak path currents is to use a selector device such as diode, transistor in series with
the RRAM cell. Diode only works for uni-polar devices while transistor works for bipolar
devices too. The transistors in the unselected cells can be turned off by controlling the
gate voltage which helps mitigating the sneak path currents. Memory cell consisting of a
resistive switching element and a transistor is known as 1T1R structure. A typical 1T1R
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Figure 2.4: Typical RRAM crossbar structure.

Figure 2.5: Sneak path currents in a crossbar.
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crossbar RRAM is shown in Fig. 2.6. Gates of all select transistors in a row are controlled
by a common word line (WL) signal. Bias voltage for reading or writing from a particular
row is applied to the corresponding select line (SL) connecting the drain terminals of the
transistors. Memristors placed in a column are connected using the bit lines (BL). Bit lines
can be connected to respective circuitries for read and write operations.
Security Applications of RRAM
In an 1T1R structure, sneak path currents can be controlled by the gate voltage of selector
transistors. Sneak path currents can be leveraged to build security applications for RRAM.
Due to sneak path currents, write to a particular memory cell affects other unselected cells by
changing their resistive states. This method has been proposed to encrypt the data stored in
an RRAM crossbar array [39]. Similarly, a single read operation contains information about
multiple memory cells due to the sneak path currents. A fault testing method for RRAM
memory has been proposed that leverages sneak path currents [40]. Similarly, sneak path
currents can be used in order to generate data tag from an RRAM memory [56, 55]. This
technique is leveraged in this dissertation for developing a secure memory integrity checking
scheme used in a RISC-V processor.

Figure 2.6: 1T1R model for Memristor based Crossbar RRAM.
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2.3.2

Chaos Computing

Chaos theory studies the behavior of nonlinear dynamical system that exhibits difficult
to predict deterministic behaviors. A chaotic system generates infinitely large aperiodic
patterns highly sensitive to the initial condition. Use of a chaotic system in computation is
an exciting field of research that can bring totally out-of-the-box solutions to the limitations
of conventional computing system. A chaotic system starting from an initial condition evolves
into aperiodic patterns over time. Based on the dynamics of the underlying system, chaotic
evolution can be of two types: continuous time domain and discrete time domain. An
example of chaos in continuous time domain is Chua’s circuit [10]. On the other hand, the
logistic map and tent map are some of the examples of discrete time chaotic systems [41].
Chaotic Oscillator
Dynamics of continuous time domain chaotic systems are based on time differential equations.
Chua’s circuit is one of the prominent continuous time chaotic oscillators that have been
explored for chaos based computation [59, 7, 65, 65]. Fig. 2.7 shows a Chua’s oscillator
which can produce chaotic oscillation at the output of the circuit. Chua’s oscillator is a
3rd order circuit consisting of two capacitors, one inductor, one resistor and one nonlinear
circuit element known as chua’s diode which exhibits negative resistance. State equations
describing the Chua’s circuit are as follows:
C1 dvdt1 = G(v2 − v1 ) − g(v1 )
C2 dvdt2 = G(v1 − v2 ) + iL

(2.9)

L didtL = −v2
There are a wide variety of discrete time domain chaotic oscillators known as chaotic
maps. Logistic map, tent map, circle map are some of the examples of chaotic maps. Logistic
map is the most well known chaotic maps which has been explored to be used in chaos
computing. The logistic map function is expressed as follows:
f (xn+1 ) = rxn (1 − xn )
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(2.10)

Figure 2.7: Chua’s circuit used as a continuous time chaotic oscillator.
Behavior of the logistic map depends on the parameter, r. The function shows chaotic
behavior for 3.57 ≤ r ≤ 4. For 3 ≤ r < 3.57, it shows a periodic behavior and for r < 3, the
function eventually converge to a fixed point after few iterations.
Logic Operation from Chaos
The generic architecture used for implementing logic gates from a chaotic circuit is shown
in Fig. 2.8 [65, 64]. Input, x to this circuit is a summation of inputs I1 , I2 of the logic gate
and an initial condition, x0 . The output of the circuit, f (x) is converted to a binary value
using a parametric threshold value, x∗ .

x = x0 + I1 + I2


0, for logic ‘0’
I1 (I2 ) =

δ, for logic ‘1’

y=



1, if f (x) ≥ x∗

(2.11)

(2.12)

(2.13)


0, otherwise
Logic functionality of this chaotic gate depends on the underlying dynamics of the circuit
and value of parameters, x0 , δ and x∗ satisfying the truth table of a particular Boolean
function. Conditions need to be satisfied in order to implement different logic functions from
a chaotic map are demonstrated in Table 2.4.
A key point regarding the scheme is that the digital inputs are summed to map to an
analog value for the input of a chaotic circuit. Here, I1 = 0, I2 = 1 and I1 = 1, I2 = 0 both
map to the same input and produce the same output accordingly. Thus, only commutative
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Figure 2.8: Architecture 1 for building logic gate from chaos gate
Boolean functions can be implemented using this method of chaotic gate implementation.
Theoretically, maximum number of Boolean functions that can be achieved from a 2-bit
input and 1-bit output chaotic gate using the above scheme is 23 = 8. This problem can be
resolved using the architecture shown in Fig. 2.9 where a DAC is used instead of addition
in order to map the digital input to an analog value. Unlike the other method, all Boolean
functions that are theoretically possible in a 2 bit input and 1-bit output can be obtained
using this architecture. In this method, digital inputs are mapped to an analog value using
an encoder which is fed to a chaotic nonlinear circuit. The nonlinear circuit initialized by the
input generates chaotic sequence of voltages. Output of the circuit is decoded into a digital
value. This circuit evolves into unpredictable sequence of Boolean functions over time. The
encoder can be a conventional digital to analog converter (DAC) where each combination
of the digital inputs is mapped to a unique analog value. Size of functionality space in a
chaos based logic depends on various parameters controlling the characteristics of chaotic
operations. Functionality space increases exponentially with the size of control parameters.

2.4

Conclusion

RRAM and chaos logic are two promising technologies for computing. RRAM technology
has been explored by researchers for more than a decade in order to develop next generation
memory devices. On the other hand, chaos computing is a fundamental computing idea
Table 2.4: Conditions for realizing different logic functions from a chaotic oscillator using
the method shown in Fig. 2.8 [64].
Operations
Conditions

AND
f (x0 ) ≤ x∗
f (x0 + δ) ≤ x∗
f (x0 + 2δ) − x∗ = δ

OR
f (x0 ) ≤ x∗
f (x0 + δ) − x∗ ≤ δ
f (x0 + 2δ) − x∗ = δ
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XOR
f (x0 ) ≤ x∗
f (x0 + δ) − x∗ ≤ δ
f(x0 + 2δ) ≤ x∗

NAND
f (x0 ) = δ
f (x0 + δ) = δ
f(x0 + 2δ) − x∗ ≤ x∗

NOT
f (x0 ) − x∗ = δ
f (x0 + δ) ≤ x∗

Figure 2.9: Architecture 2 for building logic gate from chaos circuit [45].
based on the mathematical chaos theory for nonlinear systems. These two technologies
have also shown significant opportunities for designing security enhanced computing system.
Secure design based on RRAM technology can be very lightweight and applicable to resource
constrained systems. On the other hand, chaos based designs can provide comprehensive
solutions by utilizing a large and complex functionality space. Design for an embedded
computers can accommodate these technologies in order to provide security against various
threats.
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Chapter 3
Secure Memory Design
RRAM is one of the prominent emerging memory technologies. RRAM has shown its promise
as the non volatile main memory for a processor due to its high integration, low power and
CMOS compatibility. In addition, RRAM exhibits some characteristics that can be leveraged
in order to implement security applications for a memory. In this work, we design a crossbar
RRAM with a lightweight integrity checking mechanism using the sneak path currents in
the crossbar array.

3.0.1

Motivation

Computer memory is vulnerable to various attacks that affect the security of a computing
system. Several attack scenarios have been described in Chapter 2 where computer memory
is subject to unauthorized modification [13, 66, 74]. Existing techniques use a separate
cryptographic tag generation unit for data integrity checking as shown in Fig. 3.1. In a
general integrity verification structure, a tag is generated from the memory data using a
separate tag generating unit during memory write. Tag represents the memory status in
a compressed way. Tag can be generated by using various cryptographic primitives such
as hash function, Message Authentication Code (MAC), block cipher etc. Generated tag
can either be stored in the memory itself or in some secure dedicated storage inside the
processor based on the type of tag generation mechanism. Before accessing a memory
location, tag is generated on the existing data and compared against the tag saved in the last
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Figure 3.1: Integrity verification protocol for a general method and the proposed method.
write operation. Any mismatch between these two tags raise an exception which indicates
unauthorized modification of the memory. In the proposed method, tag is generated by inmemory computation of RRAM crossbar leveraging sneak path currents. Other mechanisms
of saving and comparing tag for integrity verification is the same as in a general approach.
Due to the in-memory computation based tag generation, this method enables integrity
verification with significantly lower overhead.

3.0.2

Security Goals

Unauthorized modification can be unnoticed by the integrity checking system if an adversary
is able to modify data in such a way that the modified data generates the same tag.
This phenomenon is known as collision. The most important criteria for a secure integrity
verification system is collision resistance. Collision resistance refers to the scenario where
finding two different data generating the same tag is computationally infeasible. Collision
resistance can be both targeted and untargeted.
Targeted collision resistance is also known as second pre-image resistance in cryptographic
literatures [48]. For a sample data space, x where the tag of x1 is t1 , an attacker should
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find another x2 with a negligible probability such that x2 6= x1 and the tag of x2 is also t1 .
Targeted collision resistance for N -bit tag having an uniform probability distribution is 2−N .
The term collision resistance in cryptographic hash function usually refers to the
resistance against untargeted collision. For a secure tag generation, probability of finding any
data pair, (x1 , x2 ) such that x1 6= x2 and both generate the same tag, should be negligible.
An ideal tag generation method has a collision resistance of 2−N/2 for an N -bit tag.
Collision resistance is the primary security goal for a integrity checking system. However,
the tag generation must meet several other properties in order to achieve desired security
against collision attacks. Three properties namely Uniformity, Avalanche and Diffusion are
used here to analyze the security of the proposed integrity checking system.
1. Uniformity:
For a secure integrity verification system, generated tag should follow a uniform
distribution. Collision resistance decreases as the probability distribution of tag value
lacks uniformity. Collision resistance for an N -bit tag can be expressed as 2−αN , where
α is the measure of uniformity [5].
2. Avalanche:
Avalanche effect is a cryptographic property first used by Fiestel [23]. Generally,
a significant change in the output due to a small change in the input is known as
avalanche. In an integrity checking system, generated tag should flip around 50% of
its bits due to a small change in data. If the tag generation lacks avalanche, resulting
tag space due to a small change would be smaller. Hence, chances of collision would
be increased.
3. Diffusion:
Diffusion measures the sensitivity of each tag bit to a change in data independently.
A cryptographic function is considered well diffused if each bit of the output flips
with a 50% probability due to a change in data [90]. This property is similar to the
avalanche effect except it measures each bit individually. Diffusion is therefore also
known as strict avalanche criteria. Both of these properties are important. We assume
a case where the system meets avalanche but lacks diffusion. In this case, it might
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be possible that the bit flips are restricted to only a subset of the total bits which
essentially shortens the attack space. An adversary may observe a certain amount of
data-tag pair and find out the responding bits of the tag due to a small change in the
data.

3.1

Design of Tag generation

In this work, a novel tag generation method is developed using sneak path currents in the
crossbar array of RRAM. Current read from a selected column in a crossbar RRAM is a
function of each memory cell given that the sneak path currents are enabled. This data
dependency of sneak path current can be leveraged to generate authenticating tag from the
RRAM. In this tag generation architecture, a non-destructive voltage is applied to a specific
row for reading the memory through multiple columns in order to generate a tag. We assume
a m × n crossbar RRAM as shown in Fig. 3.2. Read voltage, VR is applied to a row for tag
generation. k columns are read using a load resistor, RL in each column to generate the tag.
Load voltage in each of the k selected columns is converted to a l-bit digital value using an
ADC which comprises the k × l bit tag.

Figure 3.2: Reading multiple columns from a 1T 1R crossbar RRAM array for tag generation.
All select transistors are turned ON in order to enable sneak path currents. Reserved row
used for tag generation is indicated by the dotted box [56].
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The selected row has a bias on the tag generation process which can be inferred from the
tag generation circuit. In order to design a secure integrity checking system, tag generation
should not have any bias to a particular memory cell. Those specific memory bits can be a
target for integrity attacks. The selected row is therefore reserved only for tag generation
in this design and cannot be a part of the regular read write operation. Fig. 3.2 shows
the concept of reserved row in a crossbar array of RRAM. The reserved row is randomly
configured before each memory write operation. There are two security benefits in using the
selected row for tag generation as a reserved row. First one is that the tag generation is
not biased towards a particular memory cell. It also improves the avalanche property which
refers to the sensitivity of the tag due to a small change in the data. Regardless of the change
made in the original memory, reserved row is always changed in each tag generation instant.

3.2

Integrity Protocol

The tag generation is performed on individual memory sections. A memory section consists
of multiple memory blocks where each block has multiple words. The same reserved row is
used while generating tag from multiple sections of the memory. It is also possible to use
individual reserved row for each section which would possibly increase the implementation
overhead. Tag is generated after each write operation and saved to a tag storage. Memory
access is verified at each read operation by generating the tag from the existing data and
comparing with the saved tag. Reserved row is not changed during the tag regeneration
before a read operation. Steps of the sneak path current based tag generation can be divided
into read and write phases as follows:
Write and Tag Generation:
• Memory cells in the reserved row are written with random bits.
• Regular write operation is performed by keeping the respective select transistors on.
• Tag is generated from the respective memory section and saved in a secure tag storage.
The tag can be stored in the similar way of storing tags in the memory authentication scheme
based on a hash function described in [20].
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Read and Verification:
• Tag is generated from the current memory section prior to a read operation. Reserved
row is unchanged during tag regeneration
• Regenerated tag from a section is compared with the tag saved during the last write
• An exception is thrown if the tags do not match. Regular read operation is performed
otherwise.

3.3
3.3.1

Performance Results
Security

Integrity verification protocols are dependent on the security of tag generation. An adversary
may try to leverage inadequate collision resistance of a protocol in order to modify the
memory. In such cases, the same tag is generated as it was for the previous memory status.
Collision resistance is an important requirement for any tag generation protocol [1]. The
design goal of a secure integrity checking protocol is maximizing required number of trials
in order to find a collision using brute force. This is analogous to the birthday problem of
finding two or more students in a classroom having the same birthday [5]. Security against
collision based on the birthday attack can be evaluated in terms of collision rate. Collision
rate is the minimum number of trials required for a collision in the tags of two arbitrary
data.
A MATLAB model for solving the crossbar is used here in order to evaluate the security of
this tag generator leveraging sneak path currents. The MATLAB code for the RRAM solver
is given in Appendix A.1. The select transistor of the 1T1R cell is modeled as an ideal switch.
Nominal resistance values considered for the RRAM cells are 57M Ω and 58KΩ, respectively
for the OFF (HRS) and ON (LRS) state. For simulation, 20% and 10% standard deviations
are considered for the OFF and ON state resistances of the memory cells. Memory is read
using a voltage of 600 mV and a load resistor of 58KΩ. A 4-bit ADC is considered with a
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10 mV resolution for the tag generation. Nominal HRS and LRS values for the RRAM cells
used in the simulation are collected from an earlier work [62].
Tag generation using the method designed for this work is dependent on the crossbar
dimensions. Crossbars of different sizes have been investigated in order to find an optimal
dimension for securing the protocol against the birthday attack. Probability of collision with
a particular number of trial is estimated for each of these observations. Crossbar dimension
that gives the lowest probability is considered as the optimal design for security.
Fig. 3.3 shows that probability of collision increases with the number of rows and
decreases with the number of columns in the crossbar. After a certain point, collision
probability increases with the number of columns in a crossbar. An optimal dimension
for crossbar can be found based on the analysis of collision probability.
A crossbar RRAM is simulated with the optimal dimension in order to find the collision
rate of the tag generator. Different number of trials are considered for finding a collision.
Number of trials required on an average for having a collision with 50% probability is the
collision rate [5]. Collision rates are estimated for different tag sizes considered in the
simulation. Collision resistance can be measured as the inverse of collision rate. Fig. 3.4
shows the plot of collision resistances for an RRAM tag generator for various tag sizes. An
r

ideal tag generator has a collision resistance of 2− 2 , where r represents the total number
of bits in the tag [5]. In order to find the deviation from ideal value, simulated results of
collision rates are fitted with the equation: 2−α.r , where α is a fitting parameter. The best
r

fitting requires an α of 0.40 implying that the collision rate is 2− 2.5 . Comparison between
the two equations for collision rate suggests that the tag generation method considered in
this work requires 25% more tag bits in order to achieve the same level of collision resistances
as expected from an ideal tag generating function. However, the overhead associated with
additional tag bits is compensated by the lightweight implementation of tag generation. In
this method, tag is generated by the memory itself while an individual tag generator is used
in conventional implementations.
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Figure 3.3: Collision probability of a 32 bit tag for different dimension of crossbar. Number
of trials considered for finding the collision probability in this experiment is 256. [56]

Figure 3.4: Comparison of collision rate with respect to tag sizes for a standard tag generator
and the one designed this work. Simulated results for tag sizes up to 32 bits are fitted and
interpolated for predicting the collision rate of higher tag sizes [56].
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3.4

Analytical model

The tag generation method shown in this work requires more tag bits in order to provide ideal
security against collision attacks. This requirement for extra bits is caused by the biased
contribution of reserved row memory cells to the sneak path currents. A revised design has
been developed towards more secure design with the same number of tag bits as required by
an ideal tag generator. In this revised design, only the unselected cells in the reserved row
are randomly configured instead of the full reserved row. Selected cells in the reserved row
are kept at the OFF states in order to minimize their contribution in sneak path currents.
An analytical model is also developed with a view to having design guidelines for more
robust tag generation against integrity attacks. Additional architectural modifications are
made to the basic tag generation circuit described in section 3.1.
Let’s consider the simplified crossbar network shown in 3.5(a) represented in terms of
the memory cell resistances. RRAM memory cells can be categorized into 4 types based
on their position in the crossbar array. Type 0 and 1 are the memory cells in the selected
row connected to the selected and unselected columns, respectively. Similarly, memory cells
in the unselected rows connected to the unselected and selected columns are type 2 and 3,
respectively. These 4 types are labelled as R0 , R1 , R2 and R3 , respectively.
In order to completely get rid of the bias of the selected cells in the reserved row, they are
always kept OFF. Instead of the whole reserved row, only the unselected cells are reconfigured
in this modified design. A Memory cell in the OFF state can be represented as an open
circuit if the ON/OFF ratio is sufficiently higher. The selected cells R0,1 R0,1 , R0,2 ,..R0,k in
the reserved row are removed from the equivalent circuit of Fig. 3.5(b) since they are always
in the OFF state. Now, we can obtain the load voltage, Vi in the ith sampled column using
fundamental circuit analysis.
Vi =

where Gi =

1
.
R3i,eq +RL

VR .Gi .RL
1 + (R1,eq + R2,eq ).

Pk
1

Gi

,

(3.1)

Vi is converted to a binary value, τi by comparing with a reference

voltage, VR /2. τi is the ith bit of the overall tag. In this section, an analytical model is
developed for analyzing the statistical properties of the generated tag required for a secure
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(a)

(b)
Figure 3.5: (a) Crossbar RRAM architecture for tag generation using multiple columns
sampling. Unselected rows and columns are shorted in this architecture. (b) Redrawn
crossbar network of (a) considering equivalent resistances for memory cells of the same type
[55].
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data integrity checking. The model predicts the probability of τi being 1 (0) in relation to
different parameters such as crossbar size, tag size, load resistance value. Probability of τi
being 1 can be expressed as follows:
P r(τi = 1) = P r(Vi ≥
Substituting for Vi , the inequality Vi ≥

VR
2

VR
).
2

(3.2)

can be rewritten as:

VR .Gi .RL
1 + (R1,eq + R2,eq ).

Pk
1

Gi

≥

VR
,
2

(3.3)

which reduces to
R1,eq + R2,eq ≤

2.Gi .RL − 1
.
Pk
j=1 Gj

(3.4)

R1,eq , R2,eq , R3i,eq are the equivalent resistances of different cell types defined earlier.
Equivalent resistances for each category can be represented approximately as the inverse of
total number of ON cells. The load resistance is also expressed as a fraction or multiple of
ON resistance.
R1,eq =

RON
RON
RON
, R2,eq =
, R3i,eq =
,
N1
N2
N3,i

(3.5)

where N1 , N2 , N3 represents the number of ON cells in type 1, 2 and 3 memory cells defined
earlier; NL represents the ratio of the LRS and load resistance. A uniform probability density
function (p.d.f) for memory data is considered here for calculating the p.d.f of N1 , N2 and
N3 random variables. Set definitions of N1 , N2 , N3 are as follows:
N1 = {xZ : 0 ≤ x ≤ n − k}

(3.6)

N2 = {xZ : 0 ≤ x ≤ (m − 1) ∗ (n − k)}

(3.7)

N3,i = {xZ : 0 ≤ x ≤ m − 1}

(3.8)
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Eq. 3.4 can be rewritten in terms of NL , N1 , N2 and N3 .

1
N1

1
+

1
N2

≥(

1
N3,i

1
+

1
NL

+

k
X
1
j=1,j6=i N3,j

1
+

1
NL

).(

N3,i + NL
)
N3,i − NL

(3.9)

Let X and Y represents the random variables of the left and right hand side, respectively
of the inequality shown in Eq. 3.9. P.D.F of X and Y are represented as fX and fY ,
respectively. From the properties of random variables we get,
Z

+∞

Z

x

fX (x)fY (y)dxdy.

P r(X > Y ) =
−∞

(3.10)

y=−∞

Z

+∞

Z

x

P r(τi = 1) = P r(X > Y ) =

fX (x)fY (y)dxdy.
−∞

(3.11)

y=−∞

Now we can find fX and fY in order to calculate P r(X > Y ) using Eq. 3.11.

3.4.1

Evaluating fX

The range of random variable, X is estimated to be [0,

(n−k)(m−1)
].
m

The upper boundary can

be approximated as n − k for a considerably large m. Now, fX (p − 1 ≤ X < p) represents
the probability of X having a value between p − 1 and p, where p is an integer between 1
and n − k. The condition p − 1 ≤ X < p reduces to,
N1 ∗ p
N1 ∗ (p − 1)
≤ N2 <
.
N 1 − (p − 1)
N1 − p

(3.12)

The lower limit of N2 from Eq. 3.12 can not be larger than the maximum value of N2 , i.e.
N1 ∗ (p − 1)
≤ N2,max .
N 1 − (p − 1)

(3.13)

N2,max ∗ (p − 1)
,
N2,max − (p − 1)

(3.14)

Eq. 3.13 is simplified as
N1 ≥
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which eventually reduces to
N1 ≥

(m − 1) ∗ (n − k) ∗ (p − 1)
.
(m − 1) ∗ (n − k) − (p − 1)

(3.15)

Now, fX (p − 1 ≤ X < p) can be estimated as follows:

fX (p − 1 ≤ X < p) =

n−k
X

P r(N1 = i)

u2,i
X

P r(N2 = j),

(3.16)

u1,i

i=r

where r is the minimum value of N1 found from Eq. 3.15.
r = ceil(

(n − k) ∗ (m − 1) ∗ (p − 1)
),
(n − k) ∗ (m − 1) − (p − 1)

(3.17)

u1,i and u2,i can be found from the lower and upper limit of N2 given in Eq. 3.12.
u1,i = ceil(

u2,i =

i ∗ (p − 1)
)
i−p+1

(3.18)



f loor( i∗p ), if f loor( i∗p ) ≤ (m − 1) ∗ (n − k)
i−p
i−p

(3.19)


(m − 1) ∗ (n − k), otherwise

3.4.2

Evaluating fY

Random variable, Y is a function random variables N3,1 , N3,2 ,..., N3,k .

Y =(

1
N3,i

1
+

1
NL

+

k
X
1
j=1,j6=i N3,j

1
+

1
NL

).(

N3,i + NL
)
N3,i − NL

(3.20)

Y can be represented in terms of 3 separate random variables Y1 , Y2 and Y3 .
Y = (Y1 + Y2 ).Y3 ,

(3.21)

where
Y1 =

1
N3,i
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1
+

1
NL

(3.22)

Y2 =

k
X

1
+

1
j=1,j6=i N3,j

Y3 =

1
NL

N3,i + NL
N3,i − NL

(3.23)

(3.24)

Let fY1 , fY2 and fY3 are p.d.f of Y1 , Y2 and Y3 , respectively. It can be seen from Eq. 3.22
and 3.23 that Y1 and Y2 are functions of N3,i which represents the number of ON cells in
the ith sampled column in the RRAM crossbar. N3,i follows a binomial p.d.f which can be
evaluated using the set definition of N3,i provided in Eq. 3.8.
m−1
x
2m−1



fN (x) =

(3.25)

fY1 can be calculated using fN . Since Y2 is a summation of Y1 , fY2 can be estimated from
fY1 using central limit theorem. Let, µ = mean(fY1 ), σ 2 = variance(fY1 ). According to the
central limit theorem:


1

exp
fY2 (x) = p
(k − 1)µ


−(x − µ)2
.
2σ 2

(3.26)

Now, we can evaluate fY by applying basic algebra of random variables on Eq. 3.21.
Z

m−1

fY (z) =


fN (x)fY2

x=1


1
z
− Y1 (x)
dY1 (x)
Y3 (x)
Y3 (x)

(3.27)

As fX and fY are known, P (τi = 1(0)) can be found using Eq. 3.11.

3.4.3

Security based Design Choice

According to the analytical model, the probability distribution of each tag bit depends on
3 factors: i) ratio of total and sampled columns, n/k, ii) number of rows in the crossbar
array, m and iii) load resistance, RL . Probability curves of a tag bit with respect to these
factors are illustrated in Fig. 3.6. It can be observed that for a fixed RL , the P r(τi = 1)
increases with m and n/k. Again, for a fixed crossbar dimension (m, n) and tag size (k),
the probability increases with RL . The rate of change in the P r(τi = 1) with respect to n/k
increases with RL .
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 3.6: (a)-(c): Probability of τi being 1 for various dimensions of crossbar array
represented as the number of rows in the crossbar and ratio of the number of total columns
and sampled columns. Load resistances used in these plots are RON
, RON
, and RON for the
3
2
sub figure (a), (b) and (c), respectively. (d): Optimal crossbar dimensions for various load
resistances required for a uniform probability of τi [55].
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The necessary condition for an uniform tag distribution is that P r(τi = 1) = P r(τi =
0) = 0.5 . It can be obtained by choosing appropriate values for these 3 factors. Assuming
the tag bits are independent in addition to these assumptions, it can be shown that the
proposed method meets the security properties discussed earlier. Required parameters for
security corresponds to the horizontal line at the 0.5 unit of y-axis in the Fig. 3.6. For better
demonstration of the desired design choices, n/k with respect to m for different RL is plotted
in Fig. 3.6(d) corresponding to the 0.5 probability line. Security is analyzed here based on
the basic properties: uniformity, diffusion and avalanche instead of the collision rate since
the collision is dependent on those properties.
Uniformity
The probability of each tag outcome in a k-bit uniformly distributed tag value is:
P r(τ ) =

1
.
2k

(3.28)

The necessary condition, P r(τi = 1(0) = 0.5) would also be sufficient in order to having
a uniform distribution for the tag if each tag bit is independent of each other. In Eq. 3.20,
the random variable Y is a bit specific term, N3,i which represents the number of ON cells
in the ith selected column. Pr (τi == 1) is independent due to the term Y . However, there
is exception when the independent term, N3,i becomes negligible as compared to NL in Eq.
3.20.
Diffusion
By choosing appropriate design parameters predicted by the analytical model, it can be
ensured that each tag bit flips due to a random change in the data. However, the analytical
model does not assume a small change in the data specifically. Modifications are made in the
basic tag generation scheme of this work so that each change in data is accompanied by some
extra randomness. Added randomness comes from two modifications to the basic protocol
during each write operation: i) unselected cells in the reserved row are written randomly
ii) set of k columns are selected randomly among the n total columns. Due to these added
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randomness, data seen by the tag generator becomes scrambled and random even if only a
single bit of the data is flipped. Regardless of number of bits flipped in the input, data seen
by the tag generator is random which causes each bit of the tag flip with a probability of
0.5.
0

Let, the tag generated before and after a change made in the data be τ and τ , respectively.
0

If ∆τ represents the hamming distance between τ and τ , the probability of a tag bit being
flipped can be formulated as follows:

P r(∆τi = 1) = P r(τi = 1)P r(τi0 = 0) + P r(τi = 0)P r(τi0 = 1)

(3.29)

According to the analytical model, we can achieve P r(τi = 1(0)) = 0.5 by choosing
appropriate parameters. Due to the added randomnesses, data is seen as random to the
tag generator regardless of the number of bit flips which leads to P r(τi = 1(0)) = 21 . We get
P r(∆τi = 1) =

1
2

by plugging these number in Eq. 3.29. There is exception to the general

case discussed above. The second source of randomness is basically data shuffling which does
not work for corner cases of data having unbalanced proportion of 0 and 1. For example, tag
generation for a data having all 0’s or all 1’s is affected by only the random reconfiguration
of reserved row. Diffusion results may deviate from the expected value for such corner cases.
However, this problem can be resolved with a cost of higher overhead by adding multiple
reserved rows.
Avalanche Effect
Significant change in the output due to small change in the input is generally known as the
avalanche effect. Quantitatively, a system exhibits avalanche effect if half of the total bits flip
on an average due to the flip of a bit in the input. A coefficient, σh is used here to measure
the avalanche effect. It can be calculated from the expected hamming distance (HD) value
between the tags generated from two data differing by only a bit flip.

HD =

k
X
i=1
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∆τi

(3.30)

According to the diffusion property, a bit flip in the data flips each tag bit independently
with a probability of 0.5. Let fh be the p.d.f of hamming distance between the tags generated
from two data separated by a bit flip. For a k-bit tag, fh can be found using a binomial
distribution.
 
1 k
fh (HD = x) = k
2 x

(3.31)

The avalanche coefficient, σh can be found from the expected value of the hamming distance.

σh = E(x) =

k
X

x.fh (x) =

x=0

3.5

k
;
2

(3.32)

Circuit Design and Operation

Integrity checking system of this work leverages in-memory tag computation from an RRAM
crossbar array. The memory with some peripheral circuitry can be designed in order to
facilitate tag generation with a lower overhead. Detailed design and operation of the tag
generator is described here.

3.5.1

Design

Circuit design of an 1T1R RRAM with control circuitry for tag generation is shown in Fig.
3.7. Additional control blocks for row and columns are multiplexed with the regular decoders
in order to facilitate tag generation. The memory can switch between the regular operation
and tag generation by selecting the selector of the multiplexer. The reserved row is connected
to a read-write control circuit. Unselected rows (columns) are tied to a high impedance bus
in order to implement the tag generation structure described in section 3.1. The transistor in
each memory cell is controlled by a transistor control unit which facilities transistor enabling
and disabling required for both regular read-write operation and tag generation.
A sampling decoder is used in order to implement the random sampling of k columns
out of n total columns. The sampling decoder is fed by a pseudo random number generator
(PRNG) to select k of the n outputs. The PRNG is triggered by the regular write signal to
generate a random numbers at each regular write operation. Each column is demultiplexed
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Figure 3.7: Circuit design of a crossbar RRAM with peripheral circuitry facilitating inmemory tag generation. [55].
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using the output of the sampling decoder.

One output of the demultiplexers goes to

individual read-write circuits. The remaining outputs are connected to a common floating
node as considered in our previously described tag generation architecture. The column
read-write circuit has a load resistor which is used to read the selected columns during tag
generation. The binary tag is found by comparing the analog load voltage with a reference
voltage. Output of each comparator is saved by an n-bit register. Finally, an n × k selector
is used to choose a k-bit tag from the n outputs of the register.

3.5.2

Operation

The tag generation method developed in this work can be divided into two phases. At
first, the PRNG generates a random number which decodes k columns out of n columns.
In this phase, type 0 memory cells i.e. selected cells in the reserved row are reset in order
to remove added bias on the generated tag as described earlier. The unselected cells (type
1) of the reserved row are written randomly using a two cycle write method proposed for
writing a crossbar row efficiently [92]. All cells in a row are reset in the first cycle of the
two cycle write method. Only the desired cells are set in the second cycle. RRAM cells
such as memristor exhibits stochastic switching behavior [26, 43]. The switching probability
in a binary memristor is a function of the width of the applied write pulse. Probability of
switching increases with the write pulse width. There is a particular window for the pulse
width around which the memristor switches with a 50% probability. In the first cycle of the
reserved row write, all reserved row cells are reset with a regular write pulse width. A regular
pulse width is chosen sufficiently large that the memory cells switch with a 100% probability
certainty. In the second cycle, a set pulse causing a stochastic switching is applied to the
unselected cells of the reserved row. The reserved row is thus configured in such a way
that the selected cells are written with all 0’s and unselected cells are written with random
combination of 0’s and 1’s. This stochastic method of writing is only valid for memristors
that exhibit adequate amount of stochasticity. For devices that do not have a stochastic
switching behavior, a PRNG can be used to write a random number in the reserved row.
In the second phase of the tag generation, the crossbar array is read through k columns
by enabling the select transistors. In order to generate a tag, the load voltage is digitized
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using a comparator. Half of the supply voltage is used as the reference for the comparator.
Comparator outputs are stored in a register at the edge of each tag sampling pulse. k outputs
are chosen as the final tag among the n outputs of the register using n × k selector.
For integrity checking using this method, whenever the interacting processor writes
something into the memory, the reserved row is also written with random bits except the
selected cells which are all reset. During the write operation, the processor also sends a
tag generation signal. The generated tag is then saved in a dedicated storage inside the
processor. Whenever the processor reads from the memory after a write operation, it sends
the tag generation signal without causing any change in the reserved row or other parts of
the memory. Integrity is verified by comparing the regenerated tag with the saved tag. The
processor raises an exception if a mismatch is found which indicates that the data has been
modified and are not safe for using in the requesting application.

3.6

Security Analysis

Security properties for this tag generation method are evaluated empirically using a
MATLAB based resistive crossbar array solver. The solver calculates all node voltages in
the crossbar. The solution can be used to calculate the load voltages and hence, the tag. For
explaining the model, a m × n crossbar is considered as shown in Fig. 3.8, where k columns
are selected for tag generation. The read voltage, VRd is applied in the first row for tag
generation. VR1 , VRcom are the node voltages corresponding to the selected row and the tied
node of the unselected rows, respectively. Similarly, node voltages of the selected columns

Figure 3.8: Crossbar RRAM considered in nodal analysis based MATLAB model.
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are represented as Vc1 , Vc2 , Vc3 ,...,Vck . The tied floating node of the unselected columns
is labelled as VCcom . Gij represents the conductance of a memory cell connected between
row, Ri and column, Cj. The nodal equations can developed from the crossbar circuit by
applying Kirchhoff’s current law (K.C.L) at each node. The nodal equations can be written
as follows using Matrix representation.

A

C



B
V
  R = F
D
VC

(3.33)

Description of the matrices used in Eq. 3.33 is as follows:
VR : 2 × 1



VR1




VR = 
VRcom

(3.34)

VC : (k + 1) × 1


VC1







 VC2 




 . 




VC =  . 




 . 




 VCk 


VCcom

(3.35)

A : (2 × 2)



0,



Aij = 1,




P
Pn

 m
x=2

y=1

45

if i 6= j
if i = 1
Gxy , otherwise.

(3.36)

B : (k + 1 × 2)

Bij =




−Gji ,





P

 m Gxi ,

if j = 1, i < k + 1
if j = 2, i =< k + 1

x=2

(3.37)

Pn



if j = 1, i = k + 1

y=k+1 Gj y,




Pm Pn
x=2
y=k+1 Gxy , j = 2, i = k + 1.
C : (2 × k = 1)

Cij =




−Gij ,





P

 n

if i = 1, j < k + 1

y=k+1

Giy ,

Pm




x=2 Gx j,




Pm Pn
x=2

if i = 1, j = k + 1
(3.38)
if i = 2, j < k + 1

y=k+1

Gxy , i = 2, j = k + 1.

D : (k + 1 × k + 1)




0,



Pn
Dij =
y=1 Giy ,




Pn
P

 m
x=1

F : (k + 3) × 1 Fi =

y=1

if i 6= j
if i < k + 1

(3.39)

Gxy , i = k + 1.



VRd , if i = 1

0,

otherwise.
Solution of node voltages can be used to find the voltage across the load resistor which
eventually determines the tag. Solution of the node voltages of Eq. 3.33 is:




VR
A

 = inv 
VC
B

C




D


×F

(3.40)

Temperature variability is added to the crossbar solver in order to find how the security
properties of generated tags are affected by temperature variation. Temperature coefficient
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for LRS and HRS variation considered for simulation are 0.004/o C/ and −0.008/o C,
respectively [81]. Nominal HRS and LRS are 57M and 58K, respectively [62]. Read voltage
is chosen to be 600mV for regular read and tag generation. In order to account for variation,
10% and 20% standard deviations are considered for the LRS and HRS, respectively from
their nominal values. Several tests are performed to evaluate the security properties of this
tag generation method.

3.6.1

Uniformity Test

Uniformity is the measure of balance in a probability distribution. In order to test the
uniformity of the statistical distribution of generated tags, k tags are generated from k
randomly chosen data. Generated tags are categorized into t equally spaced bins b1 , b2 ,.., bt
with frequency nb1 , nb2 ,.., nbt , respectively. Uniformity metric can be defined as follows [5]:
unif ormity, α = logt

h

i
k2
nb1 2 + nb2 2 + ... + nbt 2

(3.41)

If the distribution of tag is fully balanced, number of tags in each bin would be equal i.e.
nb1 = nb2 = ... = nbt =

k
t

which results in a uniformity of 1 according to the Eq. 3.41. The

uniformity of the proposed tag generation is calculated using a k of 1000 and t of 256.

3.6.2

Avalanche Test

Avalanche test measures the hamming distance between the tags of a random data and and
its 1 bit flipped variants. A number (k) of such data pairs are generated randomly and
corresponding tag pairs are calculated. Let, H1 , H2 ,..., Hk are hamming distances between
the generated tag pairs. The hamming distance is represented as the percentage of bit change
between the two tags. Average hamming distance is calculated to measure the avalanche
effect. The term avalanche coefficient (Av) is used here in order to measure the avalanche
effect quantitatively. The avalanche coefficient is 0.5 for a tag generation system having the
perfect avalanche effect.
Pk

i=1

Av =

K
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Hi

(3.42)

3.6.3

Diffusion Test

Diffusion test measures the probability of a tag bit being flipped in response to a bit flip in
the data. In this test, the same tag pairs generated for the avalanche test are used. However,
the average of individual bit distance is measured here unlike the avalanche test. Let, d1 ,
d2 ,..., dk represents the average bit distances of each bit across k pairs of tags. Diffusion
coefficient (dif f ) is evaluated by taking the geometric mean of the the average flip in each
bit. Desired diffusion coefficient is 50% for a secure tag generation system.
dif f =

3.6.4

p
k
d1 .d2 ....dk

(3.43)

Security Results

Optimal design choices for desired security of the proposed tag generation method can
be found from the developed analytical model. Such design choices in terms of crossbar
sizes, load resistance value, sampled columns to total columns ratio are described in section
3.4.3. In order to validate the analytical model, the proposed RRAM circuit with integrity
checking protocol is simulated using the MATLAB based simulation model. Optimal design
parameters in terms of crossbar dimensions and load resistance values are considered in the
simulation.
According to the analytical model, the integrity checking security properties of the
proposed memory is a function of the number of total columns to sampled columns ratio
in the crossbar. The number of sampled columns is essentially the tag size because each
sampled columns produces 1 bit of the tag from respective load voltages. Optimal design
choices can be found in terms of the ratio of the tag size and total columns. Therefore,
these findings apply to arbitrary tag sizes given that the number of crossbar columns scale
accordingly. For example, the number of total columns to sampled columns (tag size) ratio is
12 for the desired security when the number of row is 8 and load resistance is

RON
.
2

Therefore,

the security results hold for any pairs of column size and tag size such as (96,8), (192,16),
(384,32) that meets a ratio of 12.
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In the design flow of the proposed RRAM, the number of rows, m is chosen first.
Corresponding ratio of number of total columns and the tag size (n/k) is found based on
the optimal design choices suggested by the analytical model. Finally, desired number of
columns is found by multiplying the ratio with the tag size.
Security results are shown in Table 3.1 for all model suggested security driven design
choices with a tag size of 8. These results are generated using room temperature.
From the results demonstrated in Table 3.1, it can be seen that the avalanche and diffusion
coefficients are close to 0.50 for all of the optimal design choices. However, uniformity
deviates from its ideal value 1 when the total number of rows in the crossbar increases for a
fixed load resistance value. Uniformity deterioration rate increases with respect to the row
size as larger load resistance is used.
This deviation of uniformity for the distribution of generated tag can be explained by
the analytical model. The analytical model evaluates the probability of each tag bit being
1(0) individually. It has already been described that for a uniform distribution each tag bit
needs to be independent of each other while having a 0.5 probability of being 1(0). The right
hand side of the inequality shown in Eq. 3.9 has the term N3,i and NL . The definition of the
terms N3,i and NL can be found in section 3.4. The term N3,i is the term associated with
individual columns and causes each tag bit being independent of each other. However, when
the number of rows, m increases, the number of cells in each column increases too and so
does the term, N3,i . For some row size, the term
term

1
N3,i

1
NL

which is a constant dominates over the

and hence Eq. 3.9 lacks independence across the sampled columns. Sample space

for the tag is therefore reduced which results in a lower uniformity in spite of each tag bit
has the uniform probability of being 1 or 0. This condition arises also when the ratio (NL )
of ON resistance and load resistance (RL ) decreases which consequently makes the term
dominate over the term

1
N3,i

1
NL

in Eq. 3.9.

The results demonstrated in Table 3.1 are generated by considering room temperature in
the MATLAB based simulator. The effect of temperature variation on the security properties
of the tag generator is estimated by considering two corner temperatures 0o C and 100o C.
Security results with the temperatures 0o C and 100o C is shown in Table 3.2 by considering
a load resistance of

RON
.
3
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Table 3.1: Security results represented as uniformity, avalanche and diffusion for optimal
crossbar dimensions with different load resistance values. An 8-bit tag (number of sampled
columns) is considered in this analysis [55].
RLOAD
RON
3

RON
2

RON

Crossbar Size
8 × 264
10 × 176
12 × 120
14 × 104
16 × 92
8 × 96
10 × 72
12 × 60
14 × 58
16 × 55
8 × 34
10 × 32
12 × 30
14 × 29
16 × 28

Uniformity Avalanche
0.9596
0.5035
0.9561
0.5011
0.9602
0.4983
0.9612
0.4946
0.9056
0.4948
0.9619
0.4983
0.9583
0.4913
0.8931
0.4853
0.7395
0.4945
0.6264
0.4989
0.7150
0.5009
0.5821
0.4951
0.4751
0.5052
0.3507
0.5145
0.3241
0.4931

Diffusion
0.4870
0.4930
0.5080
0.4860
0.4930
0.4833
0.4860
0.4900
0.4810
0.4860
0.4760
0.4540
0.4690
0.4610
0.4720

Table 3.2: Effect of temperature variability on the uniformity, avalanche and diffusion
properties of the RRAM tag generator [55].
Crossbar Size
8 × 264
10 × 176
12 × 120
14 × 104
16 × 92

Uniformity
00 C
1000 C
0.9562 0.9584
0.9590 0.9681
0.9581 0.9583
0.9577 0.9584
0.8911 0.8963

Avalanche
0C
1000 C
0.4959 0.4988
0.4905 0.5008
0.4984 0.4946
0.4890 0.4996
0.4999 0.5012
0
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Diffusion
0C
1000 C
0.5159 0.4854
0.4994 0.4904
0.4944 0.4931
0.4997 0.4873
0.4994 0.4899
0

All the security results discussed so far are evaluated for an 8-bit tag. The results are
also valid for higher tag sizes if n is scaled up accordingly maintaining a constant n/k.
The scalability results are demonstrated in Table 3.3 where RL =

RON
2

and n/k = 12. 8,

16, 32 and 64-bit tags are considered for demonstrating the scalability of the proposed tag
generation method.
The analytical model can be validated by the simulation results presented in Table 3.3.
Model suggested design choices exhibit the desired security in most of the cases. However,
few cases yields a security level slightly deviated from the general prediction of the analytical
model. Again, such deviations can be explained based on additional assumptions considered
in the model. Therefore, design choices made using the analytical model provides a sufficient
level of confidence.

3.7

Reliability Analysis

Reliability is an important characteristics of a system to be usable. In this work, tag
generation must be reliable in the consecutive reads after a write operation. However,
memristor based RRAM cells suffers from a number of different variations that hinders
the reliability. Variation sources considered in this work are supply voltage, temperature,
load resistance and cycle to cycle variation. In this section, these variability sources and how
they affect the reliability of tag generation are discussed.

3.7.1

Variability Sources

Cycle to cycle variation is generally one of the major reliability deterrents in memristor based
systems. Memristor exhibits variation in different parameters across set/reset cycles. Since
the read operation is performed using a non-destructive voltage, the variation is dominant
in only the write operation. A reliable rag generation method requires that generated tags
are exactly same over multiple read operations on the same data. Memristor exhibits major
variation in one write cycle to another due to the switching between high and low resistance
levels. A read operation is less affected by variation as memristor does not switch during a
read due to the non-destructive read voltage. Tag generation during a read from the memory
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Table 3.3: Scalability analysis of the tag generator by increasing the tag size (number of
selected columns) while keeping the same ratio between the number of total columns and
selected columns [55].
Tag size Crossbar Size
8
8 × 96
16
8 × 192
32
8 × 384
64
8 × 768

Uniformity Avalanche
0.95
0.49
0.95
0.49
0.96
0.51
0.96
0.48

Diffusion
0.4850
0.48
0.475
0.50

does not involve any switching of memristors. The impact of cycle to cycle variation is
therefore negligible.
Memristor shows temperature dependency in its operation like most electronic devices.
The specific impact of temperature on device parameters depends on the materials used in the
device. For example, with the increase of temperature in a Hf Ox memristors, HRS increases
and set/reset voltages decreases [22]. Tag generation can be affected by the temperature
variation in the proposed integrity checking protocol. Voltage sources exhibit statistical
variation in the output. Read voltage fluctuation is another source of variation that is
considered in the reliability analysis. From Eq. 3.1, it can be seen that the voltage across
each load resistor, Vi is directly proportional to the read voltage, VR . Therefore, fluctuation
in read voltage has a direct impact on the generated tags.
Load resistance is another critical design parameters for the proposed tag generation
method. The analytical model described earlier shows that the statistical properties of the
generated tag exhibit significant changes for three different load resistances. Thus, variation
in load resistance can be a potential factor affecting the load voltage and hence, the tag
generation.

3.7.2

Reliability Test and Results

The RRAM tag generator is simulated using a transistor level circuit simulator, Cadence
Spectre in order to investigate the reliability.

In this simulation, tag from a random

data stored in the RRAM is generated for a number of observations. The simulator is
provided with a random value within respective distribution for each of the design parameters
exhibiting variation. 2% cycle to cycle variation for memristor, 0◦ C to 100◦ C temperature
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range, and 5% variation for load resistance [81] are considered for this variability analysis.
The read voltage considered in the simulation is modelled with a supply with 20 mV variation
[75]. Generated tag during the write operation is saved as the reference. During reading from
the memory, the reference tag is compared with the regenerated tag for integrity verification.
Regenerated tags during each read operations before a new write operation is required to be
the same for a reliable integrity checking. In the reliability simulation, the percentage of tag
mismatch among regenerated tags is used as the measure of reliability. Reliability results
are averaged over generated tags corresponding to a number of random data in the RRAM.
Table 3.4 demonstrates reliability results for three different sizes of RRAM exhibiting the
best security corresponding to each of the load resistance values considered. Results indicate
that a load resistance of

RON
2

results in higher reliability than designs with other two choices.

In the proposed tag generation architecture, tags are generated by converting the analog
load voltage into a binary value using a comparator. It can be inferred that memory states
providing less margin for the load voltage as compared to the comparator reference are
less reliable. For tag generation, these memory states show high susceptibility to variation.
Analog load voltage can be interpreted as the tag bit differently due to the variability of
different parameters. However, the reliability of the system can be increased by identifying
these states correctly and applying standard error correction schemes. Error correction is
often used for other nanoelectronic systems such as physically unclonable functions (PUF) in
order to improve reliability [12]. Developing a detailed reliability model relating the impact
of design parameters on the reliability of tag generation can be a great future direction based
on this work. Analytical model developed here can be modified by including the variability
of design parameters. This will enable the designers choose optimal designs with a goal for
maximizing both reliability and security.
Table 3.4: Reliability results for the tag generator having an optimal crossbar sizes for three
different load resistance values[55].
RLOAD
RON /3
RON /2
RON

Crossbar Size
12 × 120
8 × 96
8 × 34
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Reliability (%)
83.11%
91.44%
83.11%

3.8

Overhead Analysis

Existing memory integrity checking works require operations that are computationally
extensive. On the other hand, the method developed for this work uses a single read
operation for tag generation leveraging the sneak path currents in the crossbar RRAM. Few
comparables to our work proposed in different literatures are chosen here in order to perform
a comparative study of overheads incurred by the design implementations [33, 73, 94]. A
prototype implementation of the proposed work is compared with these works. For a fair
comparison, a 64 bit memory and 8 bit tag is considered for all of these implementations.
Table 3.5 shows the implementation cost for the proposed design and other 3 comparables.
Cost metrics used in the comparisons of tag generation circuits are energy consumption,
transistor counts and delay. A custom prototype is implemented for the design of Hong
et al.’s work [33] for estimating its overheads. Overhead results for other two comparables
[73, 94] are collected from the comparative study presented in [33]. According to the results
in Table 3.5, the proposed design shows significant improvement over other comparables
considered here. The design of Hong et al. is considered as the reference for overhead
comparison since it exhibits the least overhead among 3 comparble designs. Proposed design
shows nearly a 10× improvement in energy consumption. The improvement in transistor
counts and the delay is nearly 2.5× .
The improvements of the proposed design over other existing works can be analyzed by
various factors. Data processing for tag generation in the proposed design requires only a
simple read operation. On the contrary, multiple rounds of operations such as shuffling,
rotation and XOR are performed in the design by Hong. et al.. Some extra processing is
needed for the proposed design too. However, it is performed only on the columns of the
crossbar RRAM instead of the whole memory. In contrast, in other methods, operations
Table 3.5: Cost comparison of the RRAM based tag generator with three existing lightweight
tag generation schemes[55].
Overhead
Energy (pJ)
Delay
(ns)
Transistor count

Hong et al.
96
50

Yan et al.
408
104

Roger et al.
455
138

Proposed
9.75
20

9358

15340

15340

3456
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are performed on each data.

Therefore, the proposed design requires significantly less

overhead than other existing tag generating circuits considered here for comparison. The
delay improvement of the proposed design is also significant. Delay for the tag generation
in the proposed method includes only the time of a single read operation and propagation
delay of peripheral read write circuitry.
The proposed design has some additional overheads in memory write as the write
operation requires additional write in reserved row. In order to minimize this overhead,
a cost effective method is proposed for writing the reserved row using only a reset-set cycle
of memristor. In addition, this extra overhead is involved only in the tag generation during
write to the memory. The step of writing the reserved row is skipped in tag generation during
reading. Therefore, the average case delay shows a significant reduction over the delay of
other existing designs considered in this comparative study.

3.9

Conclusion

Integrity checking protocol is important in order to design a secure memory system. Most
existing solutions use expensive crypto primitives which can not be afforded by many resource
constrained systems. Proposed RRAM memory design uses sneak path currents in order to
develop a lightweight tag generation scheme. An analytical model has been developed from
the proposed design to help designers choose design choices optimal for security. Security
properties have been investigated from the circuit level implementation which also comply
with the results predicted by the analytical model. This RRAM based memory design with an
integrated tag generation protocol facilitates a very cost effective way for verifying integrity
of the memory data. This design can easily be incorporated in any microarchitectures in
order to develop a secure microprocessor with special load/store instruction that will have
default integrity checking features.
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Chapter 4
Obfuscated Computing using Chaos
Logic
Security has become an indispensable part of the design of modern computing systems.
Microprocessors are the most ubiquitous computing element in today’s digital world. One
has to count for different vulnerabilities while designing a microprocessor. Most existing
solutions are specific to vulnerabilities. Mitigating each vulnerability individually requires
more resources. In this dissertation, the application of chaotic behavior in a nonlinear system
is explored in order to find more comprehensive solutions to existing security vulnerabilities.

4.1

Motivation for Obfuscated Computing

Various security threats in the processing unit of an embedded computer are described
in Chapter 2.

Unauthorized code execution and side channel power based instruction

reverse engineering are two of the major vulnerabilities in existing embedded computers. An
adversary can execute malicious code on the target processor affecting confidentiality and the
integrity of data processing. Reconfigurability provides a general class of solutions that has
been proposed to obfuscate a design in order to prevent unauthorized code execution. On
the other hand, various dynamic logic families have been proposed to prevent power analysis
attack by reducing correlation between data and the power profiles. Existing mitigation
techniques of both types require a significant amount of overhead. Moreover, a single
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design cannot mitigate both vulnerabilities. The possibility of using chaos based emerging
computing technology are explored here in order to provide design obfuscation using a single
scheme that can mitigate both vulnerabilities. In this chapter, the design methodology of
chaos based reconfigurable logic gate and an obfuscated arithmetic logic unit (ALU) are
described. The effectiveness of the proposed design is shown against unauthorized execution
and power analysis based instruction classification attack.

4.2

Digital Logic Design using Chaos

A basic design methodology of digital logic using both continuous and discrete time chaotic
oscillator has been described in chapter 2. Chua’s Oscillator is a continuous time domain
chaos generators [59, 7, 65, 65]. On the other hand, logistic map, tent map, circle map etc.
are few of the most common examples of discrete time chaos.

4.2.1

Design Basics

In this work, a 3-transistor circuit proposed by Dudek et al. is used as the chaos generator
to implement reconfigurable logic functions [18]. The original circuit was designed and
fabricated in 0.5µm process [37]. The circuit is redesigned for this work by scaling down to
65 nm technology as shown in Fig. 4.1(a). The circuit has an input, x, a control, Vc , and
an output, y. Fig. 4.1(b) plots the transfer characteristics of the circuit for different control
voltages. It can be seen that the transfer characteristics is a V -shaped curve which makes
the circuit capable of generating chaos in discrete time. Control voltage, Vc determines the
shape of the transfer curve which eventually controls chaotic characteristics. Therefore, Vc
plays a major role for ensuring chaotic operation from this circuit.
The Discrete time chaos generators are basically iterated chaotic map functions expressed
as follows:
f (xn+1 ) = f (xn ),

(4.1)

where f is the chaotic map function, x is the input and n is the iteration number. The
present output of the map function is used as the input to generate the next output. The
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.1: (a): 3-transistor map circuit. (b): Tranfer characteristics of the map circuit.
map function thus generates a discrete sequence of outputs. The circuit structure shown
in Fig. 4.2 implements an iterated map using the 3-transistor circuit in order to generate
chaotic behavior in discrete time domain. Two analog switches driven by the non-overlapping
clocks φ1 and φ2 facilitate the iterative output generation. The output of the map circuit,
xn+1 is sampled by the capacitor, C1 at the active phase of φ1 . Voltage stored onto C1 is
transferred to the input of the map circuit at the active clock edge of φ2 . The current output
thus becomes the input for the next iteration and generates a discrete time pattern.
The quality of a chaos generator can be analyzed using bifurcation diagram. The term
bifurcation comes from the fact that the period of the output pattern generated from a chaos
circuit doubles with the change of a controlling parameter. This period doubling is known
as bifurcation. The control parameter controlling this period doubling is called bifurcation
parameter. Bias voltage Vc works as the bifurcation parameter for the 3-transistor based
chaotic map circuit used in this work. The bifurcation diagram plots all values in the
generated output pattern with respect to the bifurcation parameter considering a sufficiently
large number of iterations.
The bifurcation diagram for the chaos circuit used in this work is shown in Fig. 4.3. It can
be seen from the bifurcation diagram that the periodicity of the output patterns generated
by iterated chaotic map doubles gradually with the increase of Vc until the pattern becomes
chaotic for some range of Vc . The bifurcation diagram of Fig. 4.3 has two separate chaotic
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Figure 4.2: Chaos generator using iterated map circuit.

Figure 4.3: Illustration of state bifurcation in the chaos generator circuit considering a
geometry of W1 = 4.8µm, W2 = 0.48µm, W3 = 0.48µm.
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regions ranging between the periodic zones. The two voltage ranges of Vc that leads to
chaotic behavior is found to be 0.62 V-0.73 V and 0.88 V-0.96 V. Range of the outputs from
the chaos generator circuit is wider in the first region than the other. The chaos generator
must be tuned into the chaotic regions using the bifurcation parameter in order to utilize
the complex space of chaotic behaviors.

4.2.2

Design Optimization

Performance of the chaos generator considered in this paper depends on the transistor sizing
in the 3-transistor map circuit shown earlier. The design is optimized based on an empirical
analysis where performance of the map circuit for different transistor sizing is evaluated and
ranked based on a performance metric. The goal of the optimal design is to achieve higher
range of Vc allowing chaotic behavior with a lower cost for area, power and delay overhead.
The performance metric developed for evaluating different design choices is as follows:
PM =

C wc
,
Awa .P wp .Dwd

(4.2)

where C represents the range of control voltage for chaotic operation and P , A , and D
are the power, area and delay of the 3-transistor based chaotic map circuit, respectively.
Individual weight vectors wc , wa , wp and wd are used in order to choose priority of each
factor for evaluating the performance rank using Eq. 4.2. In this work, equal weights of 1 is
considered for each factor. Table 4.1 shows the performance metric for 7 intuitively chosen
transistor sizing options for the map circuit considered in this work. Minimum length (65
nm) of the process is chosen as the length of each transistor in the design. Optimal sizing
of the map circuit based on the performance rank of the chaos generator is found for the
chosen width of 1.2 µm for transistor M1 and 0.12 µm for both M2 and M3 .
The bifurcation diagram for the optimized design geometry is shown in Fig. 4.4. The
range of Vc that allows chaotic behaviors are 0.62 V to 0.72 V as can be seen from the
bifurcation diagram. We can generate chaotic patterns for the chaos generator circuit by
applying a control voltage, Vc from these two regions. However, from the investigation of
the circuit, it is found that the worst case delay of the chaotic map circuit increases with
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Table 4.1: Performance evaluation for different geometries of transistors considered in the
circuit design of the chaotic oscillator [54].
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Geometry
W1 (µm) W2 (µm) W3 (µm)
4.8
0.48
0.48
4
0.15
0.15
4
0.12
0.12
6
0.15
0.15
2
0.15
0.15
1.2
0.12
0.12
2.4
0.24
0.24

Metric
mV
f J.µm2

0.85
5.1
7.1
3.5
4.7
7.2
2.1

Figure 4.4: Illustration of state bifurcation diagram in the chaos generator circuit with the
optimized design: W1 = 1.2µm, W2 = 0.12µm, W3 = 0.12µm [54].
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the increase of Vc as demonstrated. The Vc is constrained within the lower values, 0.62 V0.72 V in order to further optimize the design by reducing delay. It can be seen that this
region in the bifurcation diagram is not a continuous chaotic region. Rather, it has a nonchaotic region which is excluded from the design consideration in order to ensure chaotic
functionality.

4.2.3

Boolean Function from Chaos

As can be seem in earlier works, a chaos generator circuit can produce arbitrary Boolean
function using an encoder and decoder [41, 42]. Fig. 4.5 shows such a circuit structure for
Boolean functions from chaos generator circuit where the digital to analog converters (DAC)
are used to drive the analog inputs and a comparator is used to digitize the analog outputs.
The circuit in Fig. 4.5 thus works as a digital logic gate. In this work, generating 2-input
1-output Boolean functions from the chaos gate are considered. The chaos gate generates
different Boolean functions over a number of iterations. Iteration number can be infinitely
large which provides an infinite space for the functionality obtained from a chaos gate. The
iteration number is encoded by a 3 bit iteration control input, Kt which allows for 8 iterations
of the chaos generator. Additional control bits can be used with the primary data inputs in
the DAC in order to have more flexibility for generating different Boolean functions. Data
and control inputs are labelled as X and Kc in Fig. 4.5. A data input can be mapped into
different analog values depending on the control bits. A single bit control input is considered
for this work. The bias voltage, Vc can also be encoded by a number of bits to generate
multiple discrete levels. Four discrete levels are considered for the bias voltage , Vc each
25 mV apart which require another 2-bit (Kb ) DAC. The reference voltage of the output
comparator can be used as another controlling parameter for additional tunability. For this
work, a fixed reference is used in the comparator in order to reduce design complexity. The
control bits are combined into a single configuration key for the reconfigurable chaos gate.
The key bits are formed by appending individual control input bits as follows:
K = Kc , Kb , Kt
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Figure 4.5: Design of chaos gate using the chaos generator circuit.

Table 4.2 shows a truth table of the chaos gate for 8 iterations with a control bit of 1 and
bias voltage of 0.65 V. Binary output from each iteration of chaotic evolution is shown in
the parenthesis. It can be seen that the outputs sampled from the 1st iteration of the chaos
gate implements an NOR operation with the given initial condition. Similarly, an XOR
operation is obtained by sampling the output from 2nd iteration. Based on the truth table
for each combination of control parameters, we can generate a functionality table for the
chaos gate for different keys. A part of the whole functionality table is shown in Table 4.3
which corresponds to the chaotic sequences shown in Table 4.2. Possible number of unique
4

functionality that can be achieved from a 2-input 1-output logic gate is 22 = 16. The
functionality is therefore labelled as an integer between 0 to 15 decoded by binary outputs
from the truth table. For example, output from a truth table of an AND gate is 0,0,0,1 and
can be represented as 8 in the functionality table. It can be noted that the corner functions
such as ZERO and ONE are obtained with a higher frequency than the other functions from
this chaos gate. Since these functions are not used in any applications, higher frequency of
them increases the difficulty of finding the right functionality from the functionality space
for an unauthorized user.
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Table 4.2: Evolution of chaotic output for up to iterations with VC =0.65 V, Kc = 11, Vth =0.6
V.
X0 (V)
i=1
0(00)
1.199(1)
0.32(01) 0.34(0)
0.64(10) 0.339(0)
0.96(11) 0.523(0)

i=2
0.522(0)
1.182(1)
1.183(1)
0.517(0)

i=3
0.523(0)
0.511(0)
0.512(0)
0.543(0)

Xn+1 (V)
i=4
i=5
0.521(0) 0.523(0)
0.573(0) 0.298(0)
0.571(0) 0.302(0)
0.416(0) 1.032(1)

i=6
i=7
i=8
0.497(0) 0.644(1) 0.251(0)
1.194(1) 0.519(0) 0.537(0)
1.193(1) 0.5183(0) 0.539(0)
0.421(0) 1.011(1) 0.409(0)

Table 4.3: Logic functions from Table 4.2.
key
011000
011001
011010
011011
011100
011101
011110
011111

Control
Vc (V) Ic
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11

function comment
n
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

64

1
6
0
0
8
6
9
0

NOR
XOR
ZERO
ZERO
AND
XOR
XNOR
ZERO

4.2.4

Impact of Variability

Process variation is a major concern for lower technology nodes. Transistor characteristics
differ from one chip to another due to non negligible process variations. Process variation
for the 3-transistor based map circuit used is investigated by Monte Carlo analysis using
Cadence Spectre simulator. The impact of variation on the functionality of the map circuit
amplifies as the chaotic behavior evolves over time. Chaotic oscillators are known for their
sensitivity to the initial condition. This sensitivity comes from their dynamic behaviors.
Therefore, the functionality from a chaotic oscillator is affected significantly due to small
process variations across multiple chips. Chaotic sequences from an initial condition in
5 different chips are illustrated in Fig. 4.6. Since the chaotic sequence for a particular
initial conditional is different in different chips due to process variation, logic functions for
a particular configuration also vary from chip to chip.
In addition to the process variation, Monte Carlo analysis is also performed considering
mismatch between transistors. Mismatch induced variation is found to be negligible for the
map circuit used in this work. Therefore, each chaos gate in the same chip shows the same
function for a particular configuration.
The functionality of chaos gate is analyzed based on the Monte Carlo simulations
considering 100 chips. The new functionality table is demonstrated in Table 4.4 which
shows the functionality variation of the chaos gate across 3 different chips. It can be seen
that the functionality due to a key across various chips vary due to the process variation. It
can be noted that this table is a small portion of the overall functinality space. Functionality
for only 3 chips have been shown here for the sake of readability. However, considering the
whole functionality space and large number of chips, it can be inferred that functionality
varies significantly from one chip to another due to process variation.

4.2.5

Characterization and Enrollment

As chaos gates exhibit variation in their functionality from one chip to another, they need
to be characterized after fabrication to configure into a particular logic function. Post
fabrication characterization can be performed using a standard scan chain mechanism. The
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Figure 4.6: Sequence generated from the chaos generator in 5 different chips considering the
same initial condition.

Table 4.4: Logic functions from the truth table of a chaos gate for various keys across different
chips exhibiting process variations.
key
01111000
01111001
01111010
01111011
01111100
01111101
01111110
01111111

Control
Vc (V) Ic
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11
0.65
11

function
n Chip1 Chip2 Chip3
0
1
1
1
1
6
14
14
2
0
1
1
3
0
14
10
4
8
14
1
5
6
14
0
6
9
14
0
7
0
14
4
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inputs and outputs of reconfigurable chaos blocks must be accessible by the scan chain
circuit. Variation analysis on the chaos map circuit shows that the functionality does not
differ between chaos gate instances in the same chip. Therefore, it is sufficient to characterize
only a randomly chosen chaos block per chip. During characterization, functionality found
for each configuration key is enrolled into a database. Using the enrollment database, a
designer can find the correct unlocking key for the circuit and provide it to the user. The
unlocking key needs to be kept secret by the user. Without the key, one cannot achieve the
desired functionality using the circuit.
A testing interface is required in order to perform the post fabrication characterization
of a chaos gate in a chip. Testing interface enables an internal chaos gates to be accessible
externally. All possible combinations of configuration key is provided to the input of the
gate to be characterized and corresponding output is recorded. Since mismatch between
transistors in a chip has been found negligible for this chaos circuit, functionality of each
gate in the same chip is identical. Therefore, a test interface in order to characterize the
chaos gates can be implemented without a complex design for test (DFT) methods such as
scan chaining. A gate is chosen arbitrarily at the design phase in order to multiplex its inputs
and output between the regular connections and the test interface. After fabrication, this
gate can be characterized easily in order to find the desired configurations for the Boolean
functionalities expected from different gates in the chip.

4.3

Design Obfuscation

Reconfigurable chaos logic gates can be used to design an obfuscated computing unit which
can provide more inclusive security solutions. The design of chaos gates has two primary
characteristics that makes it suitable for the two target security vulnerabilities considered in
this work. The first one is that chaos gates are reconfigurable to arbitrary Boolean functions
as shown in the previous section. Reconfigurability is featured with flexibility in a chaos
gate. A single chaos gate can be configured into various Boolean functions which is defined
as the reconfigurablity. In addition, a particular logic operation can be obtained using
different configurations of a chaos gate due to its flexibility. Each of these configurations
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generate device specific unique power traces for each operation from the chaos gate. Besides,
the chaos gate considered in this work exhibits process variation as demonstrated in the
previous section. Due to process variation, the set of configuration keys for a particular logic
function is unique. Therefore, the power traces of particular logic operations from the chaos
gates in two different chips are significantly different. The uniqueness in power traces across
multiple chips is another characteristics of chaos gate that can leveraged for security.
In a general computer architecture, data is processed in an execution unit commonly
known as ALU that performs several logical, arithmetic, and shift instructions.

Each

instruction has a specific opcode by which the instruction is decoded and executed. If a
computing unit such as an ALU is designed using chaos logic, correct functionality depends
on the correct configuration key of each component. This functionality obfuscation can
be achieved using any reconfigurable logic. However, a chaos gate also provides power
obfuscation due to its flexibility in terms of implementation of a function. The obfuscation
technique using chaos logic thus provides a comprehensive security solution to multiple
security vulnerabilities in computing. The chaotic ALU is designed in a way that the
configuration key and the functional opcode comprises the overall opcode for executing
a particular instruction. The functional opcode decides the corresponding instruction’s
data path for the input to propagate to the output. Further, the configuration opcode
decides the functionality of the reconfigurable chaos block on that datapath. A 4-bit ALU
is considered here that can execute 7 instructions, AN D, OR, XOR, ADD, SU B, SHIF T
and ROT AT E. The implementation of the ALU using Boolean logic gates are shown in
Fig. 4.7. Separate blocks are used in the ALU for respective instruction types. Chaological ,
Chaoadd/sub and Chaoshf /rot are the chaos logic based implementation of the datapath used
for logical, arithmetic, and shift instructions, respectively. The input operands are a and b.
The configuration key for unlocking the desired functionality from the ALU is K̄. Selectors s0
and s1 are used to choose a particular type of instruction for execution. Logical instructions
are decoded by the configuration key among them.
A single reconfigurable block is used to implement any logical instructions in the ALU
as shown in Fig. 4.8. Since 3 logical instructions are considered for the design of ALU in
this work, there are 3× saving in this implementation in terms of number of gates used.
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Figure 4.7: Obfuscated design of the ALU using chaos based data path for logical, arithmetic
and shift instructions.

Figure 4.8: Data path for logical instructions (AND, OR, XOR) in the ALU. Four bit logical
instructions can be designed using 4 instances of respective logic gates.
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Arithmetic instructions are implemented using the circuit shown in Fig. 4.9. This is
the conventional adder/subtractor circuit implemented using the reconfigurable chaos logic
gates. The adder/subtractor circuit uses a full adder as the basic building element. The
circuit implements the 2’s complement of one of the operands using XOR gates in order to
perform subtraction. Similarly, the conventional barrel shifter circuit is used for the shift and
rotate instructions. The building block of the barrel shifter is a MUX circuit implemented
using chaos logic. The barrel shifter circuit implemented using chaos blocks is shown in Fig.
4.10. For a 4-bit shift/rotate operation, two stages each having 4 MUXes are used. Three
additional MUXes are used for choosing between shift or rotate operation.

4.4

Functional Obfuscation

The functionality of the chaos based logic unit depends on the configuration key. As already
described, configuration keys for a particular Boolean function for a chaos unit varies from
device to device due to process variation. Post fabrication characterization is therefore a
part of the chaos based digital design flow. Configuration keys for each instruction are found
based on the enrolled functionality data of the chaos logic blocks.
Let KAN D , KOR and KXOR be the key set for the chaos gate exhibiting the functionality
of Boolean AND, OR, and XOR, respectively. Configuration key for a particular circuit is
the combination of the individual keys of the logic blocks used in the circuit. For example,
the full adder circuit can be implemented using 2 XOR, 2 AND and 1 OR block. Now, the
valid configuration key, Kvalid for full adder functionality from this circuit can be defined as
follows:
Kvalid = {k1 , k2 , k3 , k4 , k5 } : k1 , k2 ∈ KXOR , k3 , k4 ∈ KAN D , k5 ∈ KOR

(4.3)

The circuit produces incorrect outputs for the application of an invalid key. Proposed
functionality obfuscation using chaos based logic is evaluated based on hamming distance
between the outputs corresponding to incorrect and correct key as suggested in [72]. 50%
hamming distance is desired in order to achieve an ideal obfuscated behavior from the
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Figure 4.9: (a) Data path for arithmetic instructions designed using a ripple carry addersubtractor circuit (b) Full adder circuit used in the ripple carry adder-subtractor.

Figure 4.10: (a) Data path for shift and rotate instructions designed using a barrel shifter
circuit (b) Mux circuit used in the barrel shifter.
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operations. Table 4.5 shows the functionality obfuscation of each ALU instruction considered
in this work. It can be seen that each instruction executed in the obfuscated ALU exhibits
an obfuscation level of nearly 50% hamming distance.

4.4.1

Chaos-CMOS Hybrid Design

Desired functionality obfuscation can also be obtained by intelligently replacing a fraction of
total gates with chaos gates requiring significantly lower overhead as compared to the fully
chaos based design. This replacement based logic obfuscation is a popular technique in order
to prevent reverse engineering, piracy, counterfeit of IC [4, 38].
The most common technique for replacement based logic obfuscation is based on the
observability and controllability of the candidate gates [4]. Observability defines the impact
of a node in the circuit to the output. The observability of a node depends on other logic gates
in its propagation path to the primary outputs of the circuit. For example, the propagation
of a node will be blocked by an AND gate that has a ’0’ in its other input. Similarly, an
OR gate blocks the propagation of a node when it has a ’1’ in the other input. On the other
hand, controllability refers to the flexibility of setting a particular value to an internal node
by controlling the primary inputs of the circuit. In this work, controllability of a gate is
measured as the combined controllability of its input nodes.
In this work, the logic of an ALU is obfuscated by replacing just a few logic gates
with chaos based reconfigurable logic blocks. Replacement locations are chosen based on
the observability of the output and controllability of the inputs. There are 3 individual
Table 4.5: Functionality obfuscation for each instruction measured as the hamming distance
between the outputs of correct and incorrect keys.
Instruction
HD
AND
50.58%
OR
50%
XOR
50%
Add
49.95%
Sub
50.36 %
Shf
44.82 %
Rot
50.25 %
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datapaths for different types of instructions in the ALU design considered in this work. For
bitwise logical instructions, a single chaotic logic gate is used for each bit. The chaotic gate
can implement the desired Boolean function with an appropriate configuration key. The
second datapath is the adder/subtractor circuit which is used to execute ADD and SUB
instructions, respectively. The shift and rotate instructions are executed by a barrel shifter
circuit which is another data path in the ALU. Each data path is considered individually for
choosing the replacement location of the chaos gate.
The circuit for logical instructions implement bitwise operations where every input and
output is independent of each other. Replacing the logic gate of a particular bit location
affects only that output bit. However the adder/subtractor and the barrel shifter circuits
have diffusability which makes it possible to obfuscate the output unpredictably using only a
fraction of total gates replaced with chaos gate. Each gate in the circuit are ranked based on
their testability which is the product of the observability and controllability. Quantitatively,
observability is measured by the percentage of the total input of the circuit that allows the
node under test to propagate to the primary output of the circuit. On the other hand,
controllability is measured by the uniformity of the logic value at the inputs of the candidate
gate. If the probability of ‘00’, ‘01’, ‘10’ and ‘11’ in the input of the candidate gate is equal
upon all possible primary input combinations, the gate has a controllability of 1.
Fig.

4.11 shows the CMOS-Chaos hybrid implementations of the full adder and

multiplexer circuits used in the adder/subtractor and the barrel shifter circuit, respectively.

Figure 4.11: Hybrid implementation of a full adder and mux circuit used as the building
block of adder/subtractor and barrel shifter, respectively.
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The first XOR gate is found to be the most testable block in the full adder circuit based on the
testability analysis. In the hybrid implementation, this gate is replaced with a reconfigurable
chaos gate. Using similar analysis, the OR gate in the multiplexer circuit is found to be the
gate with highest testability and replaced with chaos gate for the hybrid implementation.
Based on the testability ranks of the candidate gates, various proportions of chaos gates
are used to replace the logic gates in the ALU. Here, hamming distance between the outputs
corresponds to the difference between the correct and incorrect key combinations of the chaos
gates. In order to create the maximum ambiguity for an attacker, 50% hamming distance is
desired between the correct and obfuscated outputs. Table 4.6 shows the hamming distance
value for different ratio of chaos gates to the total number of gates in the ALU design. The
trend of increasing hamming distance with respect to number of chaos gate insertion is shown
in Fig. 4.12. After a certain number of chaos gate used in the circuit, hamming distance
does not increase much and becomes saturated at 50%.

4.5

Side Channel Power Obfuscation

The side channel attack is one of the major security concerns for building embedded
computing hardware.

This type of attack is based on information leakage through

different physical quantities such as power consumption, timing information, electromagnetic
emanation, etc. associated with the actual computational operation. To make a computing
system secure, it is necessary to find the possible threats from the perspective of hardware
implementation even though the underlying algorithm of computation may be considered
mathematically secure.
Power consumption analysis is one of the well known side channel techniques used to gain
secret information from the execution of a computing device. The key of a hardware-based
encryption engine can be extracted based on differential power analysis attacks [44]. Power
analysis can also be used in order to reverse engineer the machine instructions executing
in a processor [11, 82, 63]. In this work, the power analysis assisted instruction reverse
engineering attack is considered for demonstrating the resiliency of the chaos based design.
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Table 4.6: Functionality obfuscation represented in terms of hamming distance between
outputs corresponding to correct and incorrect key for various number of chaos gates used
in the circuit.
No. of chaos gate
Overhead (%) HD(%)
logical arithmetic shift total (out of 64)
2
2
2
6
9.3
24.71
4
2
2
8
12.5
35.28
4
4
4
12
18.75
44.29
4
4
6
14
21.88
45.57
4
4
8
16
25
48.14
4
4
10
18
30
48.71
4
4
11
19
31.67
49.14

Figure 4.12: Functionality obfuscation for different proportion of chaos gates in the 4 bit
ALU in terms of hamming distance.
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Chaos based logic is used in an ALU design in order to obfuscate the power profile in such
a way that it can prevent instruction reverse engineering.

4.5.1

Instruction Classification Attack

An attack scenario is considered here for recognizing different instructions of an ALU based
on power profiling. Profile of each instruction is developed from their power signatures from
a reference device. Instructions in a device under attack is then classified based on the
developed instruction profiles. Steps of this classification attack are as follows:
Data Collection
Sufficient amount of sample power traces are collected for each instruction in order to perform
profiling attack [19, 63]. Power traces of each instruction varies due to the operand and
noise level. The ALU design is simulated using a transistor level circuit simulator, Cadence
Spectre. 500 power traces are collected for each instruction for building the instruction
profiles. 5-fold cross validation is performed on the collected power data set where samples
used for training and testing are 80% and 20%, respectively.
Dimensionality Reduction
Dimensionality reduction is required for making the classification computationally more
efficient. Dimensionality reduction techniques compress data into less number of features
while maximizing the variance. Various dimensionality reduction algorithms have been
described in the literature [89, 88, 63]. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and Fishers
Linear Discriminant Analysis (FLDA) are two popular dimensionality reduction techniques.
In this work, these two techniques as well as two other methods namely Sum of Difference
of Means (SDM) and Means-Variance (MV) are considered.
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
[89, 63] is a method to extract the features with higher variance in a data set. Original
multi dimensional data is projected onto a lower dimensional subspace that maximizes the
projected variance [78]. Fig. 4.13 shows the variance plot in order to find the principal
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Figure 4.13: Illustration of variance of different components in the power data. Principal
components are extracted by considering the first few components that preserve the most
variance.
components from a typical data. It can be seen that the variance drops with the number of
components in the data set and becomes saturated at some point. Principal components are
selected up to a point where the rate of change in the variance with respect to the feature
components becomes negligible.
Sum of Difference of Means (SDM) The method of computing a reduced dimension,
D from an L-dimensional data using SDM is a method similar to the PCA. Here, the absolute
difference between each pair of mean vector is calculated first. These differences are then
added and first D points among the highest peaks are chosen.
Means-Variance(MV) Means-variance is another method motivated by the same
underlying principle as SDM described earlier.

Reasonable choice for a multi-class

classification is to consider features providing the maximum variance across the classes.
In order to find such features, the mean of each class for each dimension is put in a matrix.
The row of the matrix indicates class and the column indicates means across each dimension.
The variance of the columns are the feature wise inter-class variance. The first D columns
exhibiting the highest variance is considered as the reduced dimension.
Fishers Linear Discriminant Analysis (FLDA) Fishers Linear Discriminant Analysis (FLDA) is another prominent technique used for reducing the dimensionality of data
[24, 17]. In a multi-class classification, inter-class variance and intra-class variance are the
helping and deterring factors, respectively. FLDA analyzes the intra and inter-class variance
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of a data set in order to maximize the ratio of inter-class and intra-class variance. The
original data is projected into such a plane that maximizes this ratio. The size of the
reduced dimension is N − 1 in FLDA for an N -class classification.
Classification Algorithm
The next step in the classification is to use the data template built from the training data
set with a classification algorithm in order to classify a test set. The training data set has
the format of x, y for a supervised learning where x represents a sample and y represents
which class it belongs to. A class is assigned by a classifier for an arbitrary instance x
based on the training data set. Many different classifiers are used in machine learning
problems and their relative superiority depends on its speed, implementation cost, accuracy
and most importantly, the nature of the problem. In this subsection, we briefly discuss
several classification algorithms used in this work.
K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) The k-NN is one of the simple and fundamental
classification algorithms [25].

The full training data set needs to be stored for this

classification which makes it computationally intensive. A sample is recognized based on
its distance between the training sets. The distance between a test sample and each of
the training samples are measured. The most common class among the K closest training
samples is assigned to the test samples. Different values of K are chosen based on an
application. In this work, K=1, 3 and 5 are considered for the classifier. Different distance
measurement techniques can be applied for measuring distances between multi dimensional
data samples. Some of the algorithms used for measuring distances in K-NN are Euclidean,
Correlation, and Cosine distance functions [83, 14, 63].
Support Vector Machine Support vector machine (SVM) is an widely used [36]
classification algorithm. It performs binary classification by assigning a training set into
two categories where one category belongs to a particular class and the other combines all
other classes. It is a non-probabilistic classifier where a test sample is labelled as one of two
classes. An SVM classifier basically draws a line onto the 2-D space of containing training
samples by clearly partitioning them. New samples are classified based on which sides of
the line it falls into. SVM can be extended to classify multi-class data sets by choosing
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suitable kernel functions such as Gaussian radial basis function [34]. There are various types
of binary classifier used in SVM such as ‘onevsone’, ‘onevsall’, ‘binary complete’, ‘denser
random’, etc. Among these classifiers, ‘onevsone’ and ‘onevsall’ are considered in this work.
Multivariate Gaussian Probability Density Function In a Multivariate Gaussian
classification, a template is built from the training set for each class based on the mean, µk
and covariance, σk of the set by assuming that it follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution
[31, 63]. Now, the probability of a test sample falling into the distribution of each class is
measured. Class with the highest probable distribution for this test sample is assigned as its
label by the classifier.

4.5.2

Attack on Conventional Design

The classification attack is performed on the all CMOS gate based ALU design using the
K-NN, SVM and MVG classification algorithm. Three different neighbors 1, 3 and 5 and 3
different distance measurement techniques Euclidean, Correlation and Cosine are considered
for the K-NN algorithm used in this work. Table 4.7 shows the classification results for all
these various classification techniques. It can be seen that ALU instructions implemented
using traditional CMOS logic gates are classifiable with a high accuracy. The best case
classification result is found to be 93% using the K(=1)-NN with PCA and Euclidean
distance. It was also shown in an earlier work that instructions in a microcontroller can
be classified with a high accuracy using K(=1)-NN combined with PCA [63].
Table 4.8 shows the confusion matrix for each instruction class. Rows of Table 4.8
represents the training set of each instruction and columns represent the percentage of match
to a particular instruction class. Among the instructions, XOR, ADD and SUB can be
recognized with 100% accuracy. The classifier recognizes AND correctly with a 94 times
(out of 100) and confuses with the OR and XOR for the remaining 6 test cases. Similarly,
the OR instruction was recognized properly for 91 times and was otherwise recognized as
AND. Similarly, ROT and SHF instructions were recognized 86 and 78 times, respectively
while confused among themselves otherwise. Overall classification accuracy can be found to
be 93% which is the average value of the individual recognition rate across all instructions.
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Table 4.7: Classification accuracy among instructions for different classifier and
dimensionality reduction algorithm for a CMOS only ALU implementation. Static CMOS
logic gates are used for implementing different instructions of the ALU
category

sub-category

K-NN

1NN(euc)
1-NN(corr)
1-NN(cos)
3-NN(euc)
3-NN(corr)
3-NN(cos)
5-NN(euc)
5-NN(corr)
5-NN(cos)
onevsall
allpairs
N/A

SVM
MVG

Accuracy with different data reduction
no reduction P CA SDM M V F LDA
93
93
93
93
88
76
90
68
69
88
90
90
90
90
86
90
90
90
90
85
82
87
86
86
85
86
86
86
86
85
88
88
88
88
83
85
85
85
85
82
86
86
86
86
84
82.7
80.66 58.3
57
82.47
90.55
89.14 78.23 74.61 85.86
73
79
79
79
85

Table 4.8: Classification of ALU instructions for CMOS gate based implementation. Best
case accuracy is found for K(=1)-NN with Euclidean distance and PCA as the dimensionality
reduction technique
Instruction
AND
OR
XOR
ADD
SUB
ROT
SHF

AND
94
9
0
0
0
0
0

OR
5
91
0
0
0
0
0

Matched Class (%)
XOR ADD SUB ROT SHF
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
0
0
0
0
100
0
0
0
0
0
86
14
1
0
0
21
78
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4.5.3

Attack on Chaos based Design

Proposed chaos based reconfigurable logic can implement a particular Boolean function using
a number of different chaos configurations. Each of these configurations causes the chaos gate
to exhibit unique power profiles. Besides, due to process variation, a chaos gates produces
different Boolean functions for the same configuration key in different devices. Valid key sets
for a particular function from a chaos gate in different chips are unique.
For the classification attack on the hybrid ALU implementation, a design is chosen with
25% chaos gates as suggested by the analysis described in section 4.4.1. It can be seen that
this design has a 48% hamming distance between the outputs corresponding to the correct
and incorrect configuration key. For power profile obfuscation, the design with equal power
level for each instruction is preferable which is obtained from the design with 4 chaos gates
in each data path of the ALU. However, that design has a hamming distance of 44% between
the outputs of the correct and randomly keys. The chosen design with 4, 4 and 8 number of
chaos gates in different data paths is the optimal one which exhibits 48% hamming distance.
This design is also more uniform in terms of the power level for different instructions as
compared to the other design choices having higher hamming distance.
Four different ALU chips are considered for performing inter chip classification attack.
Each chip requires unique set of configuration keys for the expected functionality. Unique
configuration generates unique power profile for instructions across different chips. An
adversary collects training data from the chip she is authorized to use. She cannot run
arbitrary instructions on a random chip as each chip needs an activation key which the
adversary supposedly does not have. Therefore, the adversary cannot easily collect training
data from the chip under attack. The attack is performed just based on the training data
from a different chip. Since each chip exhibits unique power profiles for the instructions,
the classification accuracy is significantly lower than the CMOS based design. The attack is
performed using various training-testing combinations among the 4 different chips.
For the classification of instructions in the chaos based ALU implementation, training
and testing set corresponds to two different chips. Therefore, a whole set of 500 observations
can be used for the testing unlike the CMOS based implementation where only 20% of the
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whole data set is used for testing. Table 4.9 shows the classification accuracy of the attacks
performed on those training testing combinations. The best case average classification
accuracy is found for the multivariate Gaussian algorithm with Fisher’s linear discriminant
analysis as the dimensionality reduction. Detailed recognition rate is shown in Table 4.10
where percentage match of each test instructions with the instruction classes are averaged
over all chip combinations. The results indicate that chaos based design shows significantly
higher resiliency against the instruction classification attack as compared to the conventional
design.

4.6

Overhead Analysis

The proposed chaos based reconfigurable logic provides both functional and side channel
obfuscation. Functional obfuscation can also be obtained by look up table (LUT) based
design. However, they cannot provide power obfuscation. LUT based designs are basically
memory where the configuration bits are stored for the logic implementation. Significant
amount of overhead in terms of area, power and delay are incurred by the LUT based
design.
In this section, the overhead incurred by the proposed chaos based design is compared
with a spin transfer torque (STT) LUT based reconfigurable design used for functionality
obfuscation [86, 87] and an power analysis resistant improved delay based dual rail pre-charge
logic (iDDPL) [6]. Static CMOS based logic gates are considered as the baseline for overhead
comparison among these logic technologies. Both gate level and system level overhead are
estimated for the comparison. The design used for the system level comparison is the ALU
circuit where 25% of the total gates are reconfigurable.
There are total 64 logic gates in the 4 bit ALU circuit consisting of 4 in the logical, 24
in the arithmetic and 32 in the shift instruction datapath. For reconfigurable logic based
implementation, the logical instructions are executed by a single type of gate. Therefore,
4 reconfigurable gates are sufficient for executing all 4-bit logical instructions. On the
other hand, individual logic gates are required for each logical instruction in a CMOS only
implementation. Since, 3 logical instructions are considered in the ALU example considered
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Table 4.9: Classification accuracy of instruction set among different chaos based machine
with several classification and data reduction algorithms.
category

data reduction

K − N N (= 1)

SV M

MV G

no reduction
P CA
SDM
MV
F LDA
no reduction
P CA
SDM
MV
F LDA
no reduction
P CA
SDM
MV
F LDA

conf ig
1, 2 1, 3 1, 4 2, 3
39 19 17 20
39 19 17 19
38 17 11 17
39 17 11 17
39 21 20 22
31 30 26 25
33 29 21 23
30 21 26 23
34 22 26 24
14 14 14 14
28 28 28 14
24 25 23 14
14 14 14 11
14 14 14 11
53 36 26 38

pair
2, 4
16
16
16
16
24
28
28
28
25
14
14
14
14
14
32

3, 4 average
37
24
37
24.67
35
24.5
35
22.33
24
22.5
30
28.33
33
27.83
32
26.67
34
27.5
14
14
28
23.33
16
19.33
14
13.5
14
13.5
34
36.5

Table 4.10: Best case average classification results for Chaos gate based implementation.
Best results found for Multivariate Gaussian algorithm with Fisher’s linear discriminant
analysis
Instruction
AND
OR
XOR
ADD
SUB
ROT
SHF

AND
48
8
34
13
10
0
0

OR
19
37
19
0
01
0
0

Matched Class (%)
XOR ADD SUB ROT SHF
14
3
1
0
0
27
11
2
0
0
22
8
4
0
0
9
11
10
20
22
8
10
14
22
21
0
0
0
58
27
0
0
0
56
30
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here, 8 more gates are required in the CMOS based implementation. Number of total gates
are 72 for that case. Taking all these factors into consideration, the system level overhead
for the chaos and STT LUT based reconfigurable logic can be estimated. On the other
hand, iDDPL targets at counter-measuring the power analysis attack by a current balancing
technique where the the circuit consumes a constant power for all input values. Balancing
power profile requires the full circuit designed with iDDPL. The gate level and the system
level overhead are therefore the same for iDDPL. For demonstrating the effectiveness of the
design proposed in this work, the overhead is estimated for a hypothetical design where both
STT LUT and iDDPL are used in order to provide the functional and power obfuscation,
respectively. In the hypothetical design, 25% of the gates are considered to be replaced with
the STT LUT and the remaining 75% with the iDDPL.
OVsys =

(0.75GD + 0.25GC )X64
72GD

(4.4)

where GC and GD represents the cost associated with each chaos and standard CMOS gate,
respectively. Eq. 4.4 can be rewritten as follows:
2
OVsys = (OVgate + 1)
9
where OVgate =

(4.5)

GC
.
GD

Table 4.11 shows the overhead comparison between the chaos and STT LUT based logic
design in terms of area and power-delay product. It can be seen that for the 4 bit ALU design,
area overheads are 1.5x, 2.8x and 4x and PDP overheads are 6x, 23x and 2.3x, respectively for
the chaos, STT LUT and iDDPL. The chaos based design exhibits significant improvement
over the other two existing design methods. In addition, the STT LUT and iDDPL based
design only provides functional and power obfuscation, respectively whereas the proposed
chaos based design obfuscates both. The hypothetical implementation could provide both
functional and power obfuscation by incorporating the two individual mitigation techniques
on the same circuit. Overheads associated with the hypothetical implementation are found
to be 27x, 5.4x in terms of PDP and area, respectively. The improvements of the chaos based
design of the 4 bit ALU is therefore 4.6x and 3.6x, respectively for the PDP and area overhead
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Table 4.11: Overhead estimates for chaotic logic in gate level and system level. 4 bit ALU
with a proportion factor of 25% are considered for the system level overhead estimates.
Obfuscation Method

Power-Delay product (PDP)
Area
value(f J) OVgate OVsys value(µm2 ) OVgate
Static CMOS gate
6
0.29
STT-RAM LUT [86]
624
104x
23x
2.8
9.6x
iDDPL [6]
14
2.3x
2.3x
1.15
4x
STT-RAM LUT+iDDPL (hypo.)
27x
Chaos
152
25x
6x
1.22
4x

OVsys
2.8x
4x
5.4x
1.5

Security
func. obfus. power obfus.
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

as compared to the hypothetical implementation considered for providing security against
both attacks. Thus, chaos based design is capable of providing comprehensive solutions to
the security problems of a computing system.

4.7

Conclusion

Proposed design obfuscation using chaos based logic provides multiple security benefits in
computing as compared to other conventional methods. The functionality of a chaos based
design is locked. Only the authorized user of a chip has the valid key to unlock the design and
perform desired task on the device. Thus, an adversary cannot get the desired functionality
from the circuit in order to extract a secret. In addition, due to the reconfigurability and
process variation of the chaotic circuit, power profiles of each operation in a particular chip
are significantly different than another chip. The power template built from an identical
device cannot be applied to distinguish operations in an another device by using statistical
learning. Security of conventional computing devices can be improved significantly in this
way by applying the chaos based logic in the design.
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Chapter 5
Security Enhanced RISC-V
Microarchitecture
Security based logic and memory design proposed in this dissertation is applied on a RISCV microarchitecture in order to enhance security of computation. The microarchitecture
chosen for this security enhanced implementation is capable of executing a subset of
RISC-V 32I instruction set. This implementation is named as MiniRISC-V in this work
for future references. Designed microarchitecture has 5 pipeline stages for executing an
instruction sequence. We consider a Harvard architecture where the instruction and data
memory are separate. The data memory is built using the RRAM proposed in Chapter
3. Memory instructions are secured by the integrated integrity verification feature of the
proposed RRAM. The execution unit is obfuscated by replacing a number of logic gates with
reconfigurable chaos blocks. Thus, a program executed on this processor cannot function
correctly unless the correct key is applied to the chaos gates. As we have seen in Chapter
4 that the chaos logic exhibits unique power signature from one chip to another due to
process variation and chaotic reconfigurability. The side channel power based instruction
reverse engineering can not be performed in this implementation. In this chapter, the
detailed microarchitectural implementation of the MiniRISC-V is described with the security
enhancing features.
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5.1
5.1.1

MiniRISC-V Microarchitecture
ISA

MiniRISC-V microarchitecture implements the user level subset of original RISC-V (RV)32I
instruction set [84]. RV32I supports only integer operations. As described in the background
section, instructions of RV32I are classified into 6 different categories: R-type, I-type, Stype, B-type, U-type and J-type. Detailed description of the instruction subset used in the
MiniRISC-V is provided in chapter 2.

5.1.2

Pipeline

Execution of an instruction in MiniRISC-V is performed in 5 pipeline stages. An instruction
is partially processed in each stage and the results are saved in pipeline registers in order
to make it accessible to the next stage in the next cycle. Similar to many other RISCV processors, pipeline stages of MiniRISC-V are Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory and
Writeback as can be seen from the block diagram of the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture shown
in Fig. 5.1. General naming convention followed here in order to refer a pipeline register is to
use the abbreviated names of shared stages separated by a ‘/’. For example, pipeline register
at the interface of Fetch and Decode stage is IF/ID (instruction fetch/instruction decode).
Similarly, other pipeline registers are ID/EX, EX/MEM, and MEM/WB. Brief descriptions
of the pipeline stages of MiniRISC-V are as follows:

Figure 5.1: MiniRISC-V microarchitecture for implementing the user level subset of RV 32I.
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Fetch
The function of the fetch unit is to read the instructions from the instruction memory
sequentially and pass it to the execute stage. A counter called a program counter (PC)
generates the address for the instruction memory. All memory blocks in this architecture are
considered as byte addressable. A 32-bit instruction therefore takes 4 consecutive addresses in
the memory. Each instruction in a RV 32I is of similar length. During normal execution, PC
is incremented by 4 to fetch the next instruction. For branch instructions, PC is incremented
by the offset of the branch address. PC is loaded with the destination address during the
execution of control flow transfer instructions, JAL (CALL) and JALR (RET).
Decode
The primary function of the decode stage is to read the instruction from the IF/ID register
and assert the control signals in different datapaths with the appropriate values for execution.
Register values for source addresses rs1, rs2 and destination address rd are also fetched in
the decode stage. In the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture, branch decisions are also made in
the decode stage instead of the execute stage which causes the pipeline to stall for only one
cycle if the branch condition is false. It is worth noting that the branch is considered as
not taken by default until the real branch decision is known. If the branch is taken, the
fetched instruction is discarded and the PC is loaded with the branch address. In order to
avoid a control hazard that arises from the pipeline data dependency from partially executed
instructions, a branch forward unit is used in the decode stage. The branch forward unit
forwards the result of the execute and memory units to the decode stage. A hazard detection
unit stops fetching new instruction by the PC for a required number of cycles in order to let
few existing instructions finish and the hazard is cleared.
Execute
The execute stage consists of an ALU and a forwarding unit. The ALU performs different
logical, arithmetic, and shift operations based on the opcode and extended opcode fields,
funct3 and funct7. The first operand of the ALU comes from the register file output
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corresponding to rs1. The second operation can be either register data corresponding to rs2
or an immediate data from the immediate field of the instruction. A hazard detection unit
is used to detect data hazards created by the dependency on previous executing instructions
in the pipeline. A forwarding unit forwards the ALU or Memory data based on the type
of detected hazard. Execute unit also computes the address for load and store instructions
which basically performs an addition between a base address and an offset.
Memory
Data memory is separate from the instruction memory in the MiniRISC-V as it is built based
on a Harvard architecture. Data memory is also byte addressable. RV 32I allows memory
read-write operations using data of different byte sizes. LB, LHW, and LW represent the
instructions for loading a byte, half-word and full word, respectively from the data memory
to the register file. There are two more load instructions LHU and LBU which interpret
the half-word and a byte data as an unsigned 32-bit value by filling the remaining most
significant bits with 0’s. Similar to load instructions, SB, SH and SW represent instructions
for storing a byte, half-word and a full word into the data memory.
Write Back
The final execution result of an instruction is written back to the destination register address,
rd. The write back operation selects the final result between the memory output and the
ALU output depending on the instruction type. The address of the destination register is
propagated to the write back stage through each pipeline registers. Destination register is
updated with the results of the operation in the next clock cycle. Write back is required
in the R-type and few I-type instructions where the results of an operation between two
operands are written in a destination register. For JUMP instructions (jal, jalr), address of
the next instruction of the caller procedure is written in the destination register.

89

5.2

Security Enhancing Modification

The secure memory and execution unit design described in chapter 3 and 4, respectively
are used for the data memory and the execution unit of the security enhaced design of
the MiniRISC-V. The modified design is shown in Fig. 5.2 where the security enhancing
modifications are highlighted.

5.2.1

Chaos based Execution Unit

The execution unit of the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture considered in this work is
obfuscated by replacing some of the logic gates with chaos logic in the most testable locations
of the circuit. A common methodology for choosing the testable locations is described
in Chapter 4. Individual datapaths in the execution unit for executing different types of
instructions are obfuscated using chaos based logic. The MiniRISC-V microarchitecture has
datapath for logical, arithmetic, and shift instructions in the execution unit. A number of
chaos based reconfigurable logic blocks replace the original logic gates used in the datapath
implementation of ALU instructions. The execution becomes dependent on the configuration
key of the chaos gates. Incorrect key results in an incorrect output from the execution result
of an instruction. Incorrect results from individual instructions without the correct key
obfuscates the program behavior significantly. Obfuscation is not only limited to the ALU
instructions though only the execution unit is implemented using chaos based logic gates.
Results of the ALU instructions determines the value of different registers in the register
file which affects the decision making of branch instructions. Memory instructions are also
affected by the ALU obfuscation since the address to be accessed by a memory instruction
is evaluated by the ALU. Therefore, obfuscating only the execution unit is sufficient in order
to obfuscate the program behavior significantly. Required proportion of chaos logic in order
to obfuscate the functionality of various instructions depend on the instruction datapath.
Bitwise logical instructions are implemented using multiple copies of respective logic gates
as shown in Fig. 5.3. The path from each input to output consists of a single gate. There is
no diffusion of data between the inputs and outputs. Each of the gates therefore need to be
replaced with reconfigurable chaos gates in order to have optimal obfuscation. However, the
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Figure 5.2: MiniRISC-V microarchitecture with security extension using chaos logic in the
execution unit and RRAM memory with integrity checking as the data memory.

Figure 5.3: Obfuscated data path for 32 bit logical instruction in MiniRISC-V.
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same hardware can be used to implement all logical instructions due to the reconfigurable
nature of chaos gates.
Arithmetic instructions are implemented using a ripple carry adder-subtractor circuit as
shown in Fig. 5.4(b). The building block of the adder-subtractor circuit is a full adder
which can be implemented using two XOR gates, two AND gates and an OR gate. From
the testability analysis of the full adder circuit the first XOR gate is found optimal to be
replaced with reconfigurable chaos gates. The obfuscated full adder shown in Fig. 5.4(a)
is used in the ripple carry adder-subtractor circuit in order to implement 32-bit arithmetic
instructions.
A barrel shifter circuit is used for implementing shift instructions in the MiniRISCV microarchitecture. A part of the whole barrel shifter circuit is shown in Fig. 5.5 (b).
Multiplexer is the building block of a barrel shifter circuit. For an N -bit barrel shifter, there
are a log2 N × N array of multiplexers. The OR gate in the multiplexer circuit is found to
be the optimal candidate to be replaced with the chaos gate. A fraction of the total log2 N
chunks of N multiplexers are obfuscated using chaos logic. For example, there are 5 chunks
of 32 multiplexers for a 32-bit shift operation. From the testability analysis, obfuscating only
the 3rd and 4th chunks are found to be sufficient for provide optimal level of obfuscation.
The obfuscated multiplexer circuit is shown in Fig. 5.5 (a). Based on the testability analysis
of the whole barrel shifter circuit, the 3rd and 4th rows of the multiplexer array are chosen
to be implemented by the obfuscated multiplexer arrays.

5.2.2

Configuration Key Management

Each obfuscated datapath requires a valid configuration key for correct execution of
respective instructions.

The configuration key is demultiplexed in the execute stage

and applied to the respective datapath for the ALU instructions.

The selector of the

demultiplexer is the original opcode of the instruction. For an instruction to be executed
correctly, the configuration key has to be among the valid key sets for a particular datapath
implementation.
For the MiniRISC-V, each chaos gate is designed to be reconfigured using a 6-bit key as
described in Chapter 4. Since each gate in the data path of a particular instruction is of
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Figure 5.4: (a) Chaos obfuscated adder block used in arithmetic instructions (b) Obfuscated
datapath of 32bit arithmetic instruction in MiniRISCV.

Figure 5.5: (a) Chaos obfuscated Mux block used in the barret shifter circuit (b) Obfuscated
datapath of 32-bit shift instruction in MiniRISCV
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the same type, a single 6-bit key is sufficient to use for each of them. However, chaos gates
in each instruction datapath of instructions use multiple sets of keys in order to increase
the functional ambiguity from an attacker’s perspective. For example, 32 chaos gates in a
logical instruction use 2 independent key sets for obfuscation. The distribution of key sets
among the gates can be chosen by the designer. In this work, gates corresponding to the
first 16 gates use the first key set while the rest use the second one. The same key to the
both key sets would unlock the instruction. However, an attacker does not know which bit
position in the overall key goes to which instruction and is forced to use brute force when
attacking. Similarly, arithmetic instructions use two sets of 6-bit key and each of the logical
shift and arithmetic shift instructions uses 4 sets. The total key size is 96 bits for this design.
However, a designer can easily make a larger key by either increasing the bits in each key set
or increasing the number of sets used in each datapath’s circuit. Increasing the number of
bits in each key set requires changing the resolution of encoding between digital and analog
conversion of the chaos circuit. Key distribution in MiniRISC-V is illustrated in Fig. 5.6.
Configuration keys are stored in a key register. Opcode of each instruction is decoded
to fetch the stored key of the corresponding datapath from the key register. The fetched
key is distributed to the chaos gates used for obfuscation. key propagation from the key
register to the instruction datapaths of the execution unit is illustrated in Fig. 5.7. The
key register is write only to user in order to prevent exposure of the key. Therefore, an
adversary cannot find the key without invasive attack such as micro-probing. Moreover,
the configuration key is machine specific. Implementation of the same microarchitecture on
different physical chips have unique key combination for the obfuscated instruction set. If a
configuration key can be revealed from a particular processor chip which should be difficult,
it does not affect the security of the other chips. Configuration key of every processor chip
has to be extracted individually. The MiniRISC-V thus has an extra layer of security for
code execution in addition to the basic logic encryption technique. Machine specific keys for
an logic obfuscated hardware can also be achieved by mapping the original key to a PUF’s
challenge. In this case, required challenge would be unique in order to map to the same key
in different chips. However, the methodology developed in this work has intrinsically unique
keys for the obfuscated hardware due to process variation of chaos based logic gates.
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of configuration key among chaos based data path of different ALU
instructions in the MiniRISC microarchitecture.

Figure 5.7: Illustration of key decode and propagation from fetched instruction to the execute
unit.
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5.2.3

RRAM Data Memory

RRAM with the integrity checking protocol proposed in Chapter 3 is used as the data
memory of the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture. Security of tag generation has been analyzed
from the perspective of various cryptographic properties and found to meet the requirements.
This memory design facilitates providing data integrity with significantly less overhead as
compared to conventional designs for tag generation. Memory instructions in the MiniRISCV microarchitecture are designed in such a way that integrity checking is a part of instruction
execution.

There are 3 memory write instructions, sw,sh,sb and 5 read instructions,

lb,lh,lw,lbu,lhu in the RV32I ISA.
The integrity checking protocol is divided into two phases. The first step is tag generation
and store. The RRAM generates a tag on the existing data prior to each memory access.
During the execution of a memory write instruction, a new tag is generated from the updated
memory and saved in a secured tag register only accessible to internal logic. In the second
phase, tag is generated from the existing memory and compared with the saved tag from the
tag register prior to the execution of both load and store instructions. In a byte accessible
memory, it is necessary to perform the verification in both load and store instructions. The
tag is generated on a block of data in the memory which is a multiple of bytes. But the
memory can be written with just a single byte for a byte accessible memory. If tag comparison
is not performed during store instruction, an authorized write between two authorized write
instructions can not be detected because the tag register will be updated considering the
modified data. However, if integrity verification is performed on a cache memory where
write is performed on a whole block instead of a byte, tag comparison during only load
instruction would be sufficient. Integrity of memory data is verified upon a match between
the generated and stored tag. An exception is raised indicating that the memory data has
been compromised if a mismatch occurs between the two tags. Comparison is performed
in the write back stage after the regenerated tag is available at the MEM/WB pipeline
register. Processor-memory interaction during the execution of store and load instructions
are illustrated in Fig. 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Datapath for interaction between MiniRISCV processor core and RRAM data
memory with integrity checking protocol.
The tag generation and regular read-write operations are performed at a different clock
cycles used in the RRAM memory circuit as described in Chapter 3. The internal clock
used in the memory circuit is faster than the processor clock in order to accommodate the
memory operations with tag computation in a single cycle of the pipeline.

5.3
5.3.1

Program Execution
Translating from Assembly

Assembly language is the symbolic form of machine code that a computer can understand. A
translator, or assembler, translates assembly code into binary machine code which is ready
to be executed. In this work, a Xilinx block RAM memory IP is used as the program
memory. This memory IP facilitates initialization using a coefficient file where the machine
instructions are written according to a format specified by the radix number used in the file
header. A python program is developed as the assembler in order to translate the assembly
into the coefficient file of block RAM. The assembler code is provided in the Appendix C.
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The coefficient file can also be used in order to load a new program on to the processor
during run time.
Traditional RISC-V assembly code conventions are followed in order to write assembly
programs for this MiniRISC-V processor [70]. An user may follow the standard RISC-V
software conventions in order to use registers for writing assembly programs for MiniRISCV. Registers are symbolized as x followed by a number between 0 and 31 to indicate different
registers in the register file. Register x0 always has a value of 0. Register x1 is used for
holding the return address of a procedure. Similarly, registers x2 and x8 are used as the
stack pointer and frame pointer, respectively. Registers x10-x17 are used to send arguments
or hold results of a function. x5-x7 and x28-x31 are used as temporary registers. All other
registers are used as general purpose registers. The values of general purpose registers are
saved to the stack memory before modifying them inside a procedure. An example assembly
and the machine code for division operation is shown in the List. 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
Listing 5.1: Assembly code
Listing 5.2: Machine code
a d d i x3 , x0 , 1 0 2
06600193
a d d i x4 , x0 , 7
00700213
xor x5 , x5 , x5
0052 c2b3
xor x6 , x6 , x6
00634333
a d d i x6 , x3 , 0
00018313
b l t x6 , x4 , l o o p s
00434663
loop div :
00128293
a d d i x5 , x5 , 1
40430333
sub x6 , x6 , x4
fe435ae3
bge x6 , x4 , l o o p d i v
ffdff0ef
loop s :
;
j a l x1 , l o o p s
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5.3.2

Compiling from Higher Level Language

MiniRISC-V programs can also be translated from higher level language programming
languages such as C. The GCC compiler for RISC-V RV32I instruction set compiles a C
program into assembly code. This assembly contains pseudo-instructions which are slightly
different in their symbols and syntax than the regular assembly instructions.

Pseudo-

instructions provide better readability for further processing steps used in the translation
procedure. For example, the mv pseudo instruction used to copy a register content into
another is equivalent to the addi instruction where one of the source operands is zero.
Similarly, the jump and link instruction jal x0, Label is replaced with only j in the pseudoinstruction set. The assembler converts the pseudo instructions into an object file consisting
of machine instructions, data and other information necessary for placing the instructions
properly in the memory. For branching to different places in a program, the assembler needs
to know the address of all the labels in the program. This task is accomplished using a
symbol table where the labels and their corresponding addresses are stored as references
for the assembler [70]. An object file contains the file header, text segment, data segment,
relocation information, symbol table and debugging information [70]. Each procedure used
in a program is compiled and assembled into individual objects files. A link editor also
known as linker combines them into a single executable file ready to run on the computer.
A custom linker is developed and associated with the RISC-V toolchain to generate machine
code from a C code.

5.4

Security Analysis

The MiniRISC-V provides security for three different scenarios: functional obfuscation using
chaos based reconfigurable logic prevents unauthorized code execution in the processor;
functional diversification of chaos based logic along with the process variation makes it
secure against instruction reverse engineering based on power analysis; RRAM data memory
with embedded integrity checking protocol enables detection of unauthorized memory writes
and thus provides integrity.
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Three different test programs have been used in order to evaluate various security features
of the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture. All programs are written in the assembly language
of RV32I instruction set. Assembly programs are translated to MiniRISC-V machine code
using the assembler tool shown in Appendix C.

5.4.1

Code Execution

The execution datapath of MiniRISC-V is logic-locked. A valid key is required in order to
execute code correctly on this processor. An invalid key is expected to produce an incorrect
output. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this execution locking method, outputs of
the test programs for randomly generated keys are compared against the desired output. The
data memory is initialized with random data in order to mimic the run time condition. Due
to use of an invalid key, each ALU instruction produces incorrect responses. These incorrect
responses from each instruction propagate through other obfuscated instructions and produce
the final outputs of the program which are not the desired output of the program. In this
way, an adversary cannot execute a code on the processor without knowing the valid key.
Three test programs used here in order to test the security properties are bubble sort,
modular exponentiation, and SIMON encryption. Bubble sort takes an input array and
returns the sorted array. For testing purpose, an integer array of size 5 is used for the bubble
sort program. The modular exponentiation takes a base (x), exponent (y), and modulus(n)
as the input and returns xy mod n. The modulus n is restricted to 8 bits for faster execution
of the program. The SIMON encryption program implements the round function of a 64
bit version of SIMON cipher where both the plain text and the cipher text are 64 bit wide.
Table 5.1 shows the output of each test program for the valid key and 3 other randomly
generated keys. It can be seen that program generates corrupted outputs for all invalid keys
which prevents unauthorized code execution on the MiniRISC-V.
In this obfuscation method, only ALU instructions are logic-locked using reconfigurable
chaos gates. However, output corruption of ALU instructions due to an invalid key affects
the whole program. Obfuscation does not only affect functionality but also various other
characteristics of program execution such as program control flow and memory traces.
Control flow is the order in which a program executes its various instructions. Control flow
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Table 5.1: Results of obfuscated execution of several programs. Input-Output for the
programs are shown for both valid key and several randomly chosen key.
Program
Bubble sort

Mod. exponent.

SIMON encrypt.

Input

Output
keyvalid
keyrand1
keyrand2
keyrand3
a2,22,2d,54,66
22,2d,5a,66,a2 6e,7c,8a,98,a6 2f,30,31,32,33 f6,07,18,29,3a
fd,ff,31,4b,c0
31,4b,c0,fd,ff 28,36,44,52,5e 51,52,53,54,55 12,23,34,45,55
8b,3f,c8,dc,12,3f
12,3f,8b,c8,dc e2,f0,fc,0a,18 72,73,74,76,77 2e,3f,4f,60,71
x=d5,y=c8,n=80
61
fe
0
0
x=b3,y=1f4,n=40
11
fe
0
0
x=80,y=200,n=3c
10
fe
0
0
802c4400802d5200
52006c02
adff9fff
00230000
d0009fff
804dfe00804f0c00
0c00d402
f3ffe5ff
00000000
0000e5ff
806fb8008070c600
c6007402
39ff2bff
00000000
000002bff

and branch instructions are not explicitly obfuscated in the MiniRISCV microarchitecture.
However, the corruption in the ALU result due to obfuscated ALU instructions corrupts
the register file which in turn affects the execution of branch and control flow instructions.
Similarly, memory read and write operations are not modified in the microarchitecture.
However, the memory address comes from the ALU result which is obfuscated by chaos logic
gates. Therefore, the memory trace of a program execution is also corrupted due to an
invalid key input.
Control flow of a test program, modular exponentiation with the valid key and 3 random
keys are illustrated in Fig. 5.9 where the x and y-axes represent control flow break points
and corresponding instruction addresses, respectively. It can be noted that each point in the
control flow curve indicates a discontinuity in the program execution. It may be either a
procedure call, branch instruction or return from a procedure. Odd segments in the control
flow curve represents the continuous execution without any break in the control flow and
the even segments indicate a discontinuity in the program execution due to a control flow
or branch instruction. However, this is not illustrated in the curve in order to make the
curve more readable. The modular exponentiation program is chosen for this illustration
since it is the program with the most branch and control flow instructions among the three
programs. It can be seen that the processor follows a unique sequence for the execution of
its instruction due to the invalid keys. Control flow is shown here for a particular portion of
the overall execution time from the beginning of the program.

101

Figure 5.9: Control flow of the modular exponentiation program for the valid key and three
random keys.
Memory trace is another program behavior considered here in order to analyze the effect
of incorrect key on the program execution. Memory trace is a record of accessed memory
locations during a program execution. Fig. 5.10 shows memory traces for the bubble sort
program with the valid key and three other random keys. The memory trace curve indicates
the accessed memory addresses in the y-axis and the index of memory instruction in the
x-axis. It is clearly seen that due to the logic locking of ALU instructions the memory
access behavior is completely different from one another during the execution of a program
in MiniRISC-V. Both the number of memory access events and the accessed addresses vary
due to invalid keys being applied to the obfuscated execution unit.

5.4.2

Power Analysis

Power analysis attacks for extracting sensitive information has been a persistent threat to the
security of embedded computing. One of the more significant security features of MiniRISCV is that it is resilient to power profiling attacks for instruction reverse engineering. The
execution unit of MiniRISC-V is built using a combination of chaos and CMOS logic gates.
Each copy of MiniRISC-V is unique in terms of its power profiles due to the process variation
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Figure 5.10: Memory trace of the bubble sort program for the valid key and three random
keys.
of chaos gate as shown in chapter 4. In traditional microprocessors, instructions can be
profiled based on their power traces for various operand data. Generated power profiles can
be used in order to classify instructions on any processor of the same model since each copy is
identical. The power based instruction classification attack is demonstrated on a 4-bit ALU
in chapter 4 where it can be seen that the chaos based implementation mitigates the attack
to a great extent. In this chapter, a power attack on the 32-bit MiniRISC-V is performed
for both chaos based and CMOS only implementations. The first phase of the attack is to
collect power traces for each ALU instructions in order to build profiles.
Instantaneous power traces are required for the instruction classification attack. Transistor level simulation provides instantaneous power traces with a cost of high simulation time,
specially for a large system. Therefore, it is inconvenient to simulate the whole system in
transistor level simulator in order to collect power profiles for each instruction. A simplified
high level power model is developed here for generating power traces used in the power
analysis attack. Description of the power model used to generate power profiles are given in
Appendix B.
At any given time, multiple instructions are in various phases of execution in a multistaged pipelined processor like MiniRISC-V. In order to classify instructions, a particular
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stage is targeted. In this work, the execution unit is used as the target since it is the most
instruction dependent unit of the pipeline. Power consumption by this unit is the primary
contributing factor to classification. Power consumption by the execution unit is modeled
based on the transistor level power trace of each building block of the datapath. For instance,
power consumption of a 32-bit AND operation can be generated by simply adding the power
consumption of each 2 input single bit AND gate. It is sufficient to simulate a 2 input AND
gate in transistor level for all possible input transitions in order to generate the power profile
for a larger bitwise AND operation. Similarly, power consumption for ADD operation can
be developed by adding the power consumption of each full adder circuit sequentially for
respective input transitions. Block diagram for a generalized ALU instruction is shown in
Fig. 5.11. Generalized power model for this instruction can be expressed as follows:

Pins = Pinit +

m−1
X

n−1
X

i=1

j=0

!
P (∆Ai,j , ∆Bi,j ) u(d(i − 1, i))

(5.1)

where P (∆Ai,j , ∆Bi,j ), represents the power trace for an input transition of (∆Ai,j , ∆Bi,j );
Pinit represents the power consumption at the first time step; d(i − 1, i) represents the
delay between the ith and j th sequential operations; n is the number of sequential stages of
operations; m is the number of parallel operations in each sequential stage; u is the unit step
function.
For logical instructions, each of the 32 gates operates in parallel which implies m = 32
and n = 1 in Eq. 5.1. Similarly, m = 1 and 5 for the arithmetic and shift instructions,
respectively and n = 32 for both.
Power consumption contributed by other pipeline stages contributes as noises to the
classification of instructions since the target stage is execution.

An instruction in the

execution stage with specific operand values can exist in various combination of other 4
instructions being executed in other pipeline stages.
The remaining analysis is the same as that described in chapter 4. There are 7 ALU
instructions as categorized into 3 categories: logical, arithmetic and shift. AND (and,andi),
OR (or,ori) and XOR (xor,xori) are the logical instructions, ADD (addi,add) and SUB (sub)
are the arithmetic instructions, SHL(sll,srl,slli,srli) and SHA(SRA) are the shift instructions
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Figure 5.11: Generalized block diagram of an instruction datapath in the ALU used for the
power model. n stage of sequential operation with m parallel operation in each stage.
in the RV32I instruction set. 5000 power traces are collected for each instruction. 1000
samples are collected for each trace in CMOS only instructions. Since the delay of a chaos
gate is higher than the static CMOS gate, 1600 samples are collected for each power trace
in the chaos based implementation.
The classification attack is performed on MiniRISC-V using the KNN, SVM and MVG
classification algorithm. The nearest neighbor (K=1) is considered for the KNN method
with Euclidean distance measurement. Classification is performed without reduction in
dimensionality as well as with reduction using PCA, SDM, MV and FLDA methods.
Results for a power analysis attack on the ALU instructions of the CMOS only
implementation of 32-bit MiniRISC-V are demonstrated in Table 5.2. The classification
accuracy is found to be nearly 94% in the best case. The best case results are found for the
combination of SVM algorithm and FLDA. Results of the best case scenario is presented
in Table 5.3 as an inter-instruction confusion matrix. It can be seen that both logical and
arithmetic instructions can be classified with very high accuracy. The shift instructions
show less accuracy than other instructions due to their similarity in power profiles among
themselves. The overall accuracy for this case is 94%.
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Table 5.2: Classification accuracy among ALU instructions for different classifier and
dimensionality reduction algorithm for CMOS implementation of MiniRISC-V .
category
K-NN
SVM
MVG

Accuracy with different data reduction
P CA SDM M V
F LDA
93
92
92
31
86
84
84
94
71
73
72
94

Table 5.3: Best Case Classification results of ALU instructions for CMOS gate based
implementation of the MiniRISC-V. Best case accuracy is found for SVM with FLDA as
the dimensionality reduction technique.
Instruction
AND
OR
XOR
ADD
SUB
SHL
SHA

AND
99
0
1
0
0
1
0

OR
0
99
2
0
0
0
0

Matched Class (%)
XOR ADD SUB SHL
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
97
0
0
0
0
98
2
0
0
1
99
0
0
0
0
90
1
0
0
20
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SHA
0
0
0
0
0
9
80

Similary, a power analysis attack is performed on the chaos based implementation of the
MiniRISC-V in order to classify the 32-bit ALU instructions. In a profiling attack, power
traces are collected from a reference processor. Instructions executing on the processor under
test is then classified based on the power profiles generated from the reference. Different
classification algorithms look at different features of the samples and classify accordingly.
The advantage of the chaos based implementation is that each copy of the processor requires
a unique set of functional key. Therefore a chaos gate exhibits unique power profile across
different chips since the key in a chaos gate controls the physical parameters such as bias
voltage, Vc , initial condition, x and the sampling iteration, n as shown in chapter 4. Power
trace collected from the test processor is ambiguous to classify based on the classifier trained
by the reference traces. Diversified power profile along with process dependent variation of
chaos gates helps mitigating instruction reverse engineering by power analysis. Four chaos
based MiniRISC-V chips are considered for demonstrating the attack. Functionality tables
of chaos blocks in each chip can be built using the results of Monte Carlo simulation. Various
combinations among these chips are considered for the reference and target processors for
classification. Table 5.4 shows the classification results for all these combinations of chaos
based MiniRISC-V chips. The same classification algorithms and dimensionality reduction
techniques are used as before. It is found that the MinIRISC-V instructions on chaos based
implementations can be classified with only 36% accuracy at best which is significantly
lower than that of the CMOS only implementation. Best case results are achieved by the
K(=1)NN with dimensionality reduced by FLDA. The confusion matrix for inter-instruction
classification is shown in the Table 5.5. The instructions are confused among themselves due
to diversity in power traces of an instruction across different processor chips.
Assumption made in this analysis is that an adversary can not collect power samples
of known instructions on the processor under test. MiniRISC-V is a logic-locked processor
where only an authorized user who knows the valid key for unlocking the microarchitecture,
can execute code successfully. A random key results in an invalid outcome for a given
instruction. Therefore, it is not possible to train a classifier with power traces for known
instructions from the target processor. An adversary can only collect power profiles from
the processor she is authorized to use. Even if the adversary is able to extract the key from
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Table 5.4: Classification accuracy of instruction set among different copy of chaos based
MiniRISC-V with several classification and data reduction algorithms.
category

data reduction

K(= 1)N N

P CA
SDM
MV
F LDA
P CA
SDM
MV
F LDA
P CA
SDM
MV
F LDA

SV M

MV G

1, 2
19
22
23
29
31
20
20
14
14
26
26
23

conf ig
1, 3 1, 4 2, 3
17
3
41
30
8
42
30 10 42
30 29 45
24 15 43
32
8
31
31
9
31
14 14 14
14 14 14
36 29 25
37 30 25
14 14 22

pair
2, 4
31
49
47
55
16
34
35
14
17
28
28
15

3, 4 average
45
26
31
30
30
30
27
36
55
31
25
25
24
25
14
14
28
17
26
28
22
28
14
17

Table 5.5: Best case average classification results for Chaos gate based implementation of
MiniRISC-V. Best results found for K(=1)NN classifier with FLDA.
Instruction
AND
OR
XOR
ADD
SUB
SHL
SHA

AND
22
10
18
16
15
0
0

OR
50
73
43
49
49
0
0

Matched Class (%)
XOR ADD SUB SHL
14
5
8
0
6
5
6
0
33
5
2
0
6
9
15
1
7
9
14
1
0
0
0
65
0
0
0
65
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SHA
0
0
0
4
4
34
34

a processor by applying a large number of computational resources, the extracted key does
not apply to other copies. Therefore, reverse engineering instructions for the chaos based
implementation of MiniRISC-V using power analysis attack is extremely difficult.
The hypothetical scenario where two chaos based MiniRISC-V chips do not have process
variation is also studied here with regards to the power analysis attack. In this case, two
different processor chips of the same model can be unlocked using the same key. Since the
power profiles of a chaos gate depends on the functional key, both chips would have a similar
power profiles for each instruction and can be classified with higher accuracy. Results of
classification for such a case is shown in the Table 5.6. It can be seen that the instructions
can be classified with an accuracy of 72% in this case. This analysis indicates that process
variation helps in a chaos based computation to mitigate profiling attacks based on power
analysis. Nevertheless, defense against such attack using a chaos gate would not be effective
without the intrinsic chaos property. Unlike the conventional static CMOS logic operations,
process variation is amplified in a chaos gate due to the chaotic evolution described in Chapter
4. Such amplification leads to a unique power profile for each instruction across different
chip. However, amplified process variation would be considered a security advantage until
the functionality of the chip can be ensured. Due to the large functionality space of chaos
logic, a chaos based chip can be fully functional (with a different key) enduring large process
variation.
The classification accuracy is also measured for the ALU instructions used in various
benchmark applications developed for MiniRISC-V. Best case classification algorithms found
from earlier analysis are used here for CMOS and chaos based implementation, respectively.
Table 5.6: Best case average classification results for the hypothetical case where no process
variation is considered between two chaos based implementation of MiniRISC-V processors.
Instruction
AND
OR
XOR
ADD
SUB
SHL
SHA

AND
99
0
1
1
1
1
1

OR
0
100
0
0
0
0
0

Matched Class (%)
XOR ADD SUB SHL
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
99
0
0
0
1
47
47
2
1
47
50
1
0
1
0
57
0
0
1
47
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SHA
0
0
0
2
0
41
52

The purpose of the classification attack considered in this work is to extract the information
of ALU execution. The instructions that do not require the ALU for execution are not
classified in this work. The variants of an instruction where the ALU operation is the same
is considered as the same instruction. For instance, the classifier does not differentiate add
and addi which is often unnecessary. Memory instructions are identified as add since the
underlying ALU operation for a memory instructions use add when calculating the address
of memory access.
The overall classification accuracy of the test program depends on the ratio of different
types of ALU instructions used in the program. From an earlier analysis, it is found that
the shift instructions show lower accuracy than others. Therefore, the overall accuracy of
a program would be higher if fewer shift instructions are used. Fig 5.12 shows the overall
accuracy for classification of the ALU instructions used in several benchmark programs
developed for the MiniRISC-V.

5.4.3

Memory Integrity

The MiniRISC-V is designed to use the RRAM described in chapter 3. The RRAM is
designed in such a way that it can generate data tags upon read and write. During the
execution of memory write (sb, shw, sw) instructions, the memory generates a tag on the
updated status of the memory and saves it in a tag register. The tag register is an additional
storage unit used only for storing the tag and is itself not directly accessible. It is assumed
that an unauthroized party cannot access the tag register while modifying the memory
contents. Value of the tag register is updated only if the write is authorized. Prior to each
memory access (load/store), the memory performs a tag generation on the existing data.
Without any adversarial modification in the memory, the newly generated tag upon each
memory access will be identical to the tag register during the last write instruction.
Detailed implementation and performance of the integrity checking scheme using RRAM
is described in chapter 3 where quality of the tag is evaluated based on various cryptographic
properties such as uniformity, diffusion, and avalanche. Security against a birthday attack is
also evaluated by measuring the collision rate which is a function of uniformity. It is found

110

Figure 5.12: Instruction classification accuracy in different benchmark applications for both
CMOS and chaos based implementations of MiniRISC-V processor.
that the integrity checking system can be secure by choosing proper design parameters
suggested by the developed analytical model.
Memory integrity of MiniRISC-V is examined by emulating a direct memory access attack
as a representation of unauthorized memory modification. The 3 test programs are also used
here in order to examine the memory integrity of MiniRISC-V. The memory prototype used
for testing data integrity in this work is 256 bytes long. In order to emulate direct memory
access (DMA) behavior, the memory is given the access to an external port. The port
can directly access the memory without any supervision of the processor. A DMA memory
modification is required to be detected by the processor in order to ensure data integrity. A
simple authorization scheme is also developed to support the integrity verification protocol.
In this case, if memory is accessed by the processor itself with regular store instructions, the
generated tag will be stored in the tag register. On the other hand, prior to each memory
access, the processor receives the tag generated from the current memory and compares it
to the tag register. An integrity flag then shows the integrity status while encountering a
mismatch between the new and previously saved tag.
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The detailed circuit level implementation of the RRAM with data integrity checking is
shown in chapter 3. For emulating this attack, the MATLAB based memory model is used to
generate tag from a given memory status in order to emulate the DMA attack. A MATLAB
based ISA simulator is also developed for faster investigations of MiniRISC-V behavior.
The simulator calls the memory model function at each memory access in order to generate
tag. The memory saves tag to the tag register unless the memory is access without the
authorization of the processor. In that case, the new tag generated in each memory access
would not be identical to the one saved in the tag register in the previous write operation.
During the execution of each test programs, a DMA event is created at a regular interval
throughout the whole execution window. The integrity flag of the processor is observed at
every memory read operation in order to measure the success rate of the integrity verification
protocol. Table 5.7 indicates that the MiniRISC-V can detect an unauthorized modification
during the execution of the test programs with a success rate of 100%. This also can be
inferred from the fact that the tag generating function has a high collision resistance of
nearly 2−N for a targeted collision in N − bit tag. An adversary requires 2N trial in order
to choose data randomly that generates the same tag as the present tag register value. The
time difference between the execution of two memory instructions are very low as compared
to the time required for 2N trial for unauthorized write event for a moderately large value
of N . Therefore, it is very unlikely that an attacker can be able to remain unnoticed after
modifying the memory with an unauthorized access.
Table 5.7: Success rate of the RRAM based integrity verification method in MiniRISC-V
processor.
Program
Bubble sort
Mod. exponent.
SIMON encrypt.

Memory Instruction (%)
Store
Load
25
21
11
11
10
10
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DMA event Success Rate
91
54
128

100
100
100

5.5

Cost Analysis

Security comes with an implementation cost. Manufacturers often analyze the cost of damage
done by different attacks with respect to the cost of implementing countermeasures. However,
resource constrained IoT edge devices can hardly afford expensive countermeasures. In a
practical scenario, the countermeasures need to be more comprehensive and lightweight in
order to apply to the modern embedded computers used in edge devices.
The RISC-V embedded computer designed in this work provides security to both
the processing core and memory.

It provides security against a very broad range of

vulnerabilities. The execution unit is logic-locked by using chaos gates which provides
secure execution of programs. The very same design also provides security against side
channels, specifically power analysis. Memory security is provided by an RRAM design
used to implement the data memory, which can inherently generate authenticating tag for
verifying memory integrity. Since the tag is generated by using the sneak path current
based in-memory computing of RRAM, very minimal additional hardware is required for
tag generation and integrity checking. The overhead is reduced significantly in this design
as compared to other cost effective designs used for same purpose.
Cost analysis for the complete design of this work is performed. In earlier chapters,
detailed descriptions of hardware designs and security analyses of individual security
components are presented. Table 3.5 and Table 4.11 demonstrate the implementation cost of
comparable methods in order to provide memory and processor security, respectively. The
design cost for MiniRISC-V from the perspective of area, power and energy is estimated
and presented in Table 5.8. For a side by side comparison, Table 5.8 also presents the cost
of MinIRISC-V with a hypothetical design that includes comparable security techniques
for each of the vulnerabilities considered in this work. A base line implementation of
MiniRISC-V without any countermeasures is used to estimate the overhead for the secure
implementations. The cost of the CMOS only implementation of MiniRISC-V is estimated
from the Synopsys Design Compiler.
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Table 5.8: Cost comparison of MiniRISCV for different implementations with and without
security measures.
MiniRISCV Design

Area
Power
Energy
2
value(um ) OV value(mW ) OV value(pJ) OV
Static CMOS gate
1413
1x
7.13
1x
40
1x
STT-RAM LUT [86]+iDDPL[6]+CETD [33]
2384
1.68x
40
5.6x
292
7.3x
Chaos+RRAM
1639
1.2x
10
1.4x
80
2x

5.6

Conclusion

The proposed security extensions of the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture using RRAM and
chaos based logic can mitigate a number of security threats using significantly less overhead.
These security oriented design techniques help verifying memory integrity, mitigating
unauthorized code execution and side channel power attacks. In order to correctly execute
a program in this platform, one needs to have the knowledge of the valid configuration key.
Besides security of the processing unit, the memory instructions have a built-in integrity
verification feature in this modified architecture. This addition of integrity to the memory
instruction can be very helpful in order to detect unauthorized data modification and avoid
memory based attack hazards.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Prospects
6.1

Summary

The goal of this dissertation work is to design a secure computing microarchitecture for
embedded system applications using emerging technologies. Security measures have been
developed for both memory and processing unit which are the two basic blocks in a traditional
Von Neuman or Harvard computer architecture. The security measures are effective against
unauthorized memory data modification, arbitrary code execution and instruction reverse
engineering by side channel power attack. Performed works are summarized as follows:
An RRAM design is developed with integrated tag generation mechanism for integrity
checking purpose. Sneak path currents in the RRAM crossbar array are leveraged in order
to generate tag from memory data. Randomnesses are added to the design for security
robustness by keeping a reserved memory row and shuffled column sampling. Both circuit
level and MATLAB based high level designs are performed for the RRAM in order to perform
thorough security and performance analysis by simulation.
An analytical model is developed for guiding a designer to choose optimal design
parameters for ensuring the security of tag generation.

Design parameters in terms

of crossbar sizes, value of load resistance, tag sizes can be found from the probability
distribution of each tag bit. Desired security properties are validated based on the optimal
design parameters suggested by the analytical model. The analytical model is itself validated
against the results from circuit level simulation of the design.
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A chaos based logic design methodology has been developed in order to design a secure
processing unit for embedded system applications. Designed chaos gates are reconfigurable
and has a very large functionality space. Reconfigurability facilitates implementing all
basic 2-input Boolean functions from the chaos gate. Each Boolean function also can be
implemented using multiple chaos configurations providing more flexibility and security. The
chaos gate design exhibits device to device variation in functionality as well as power traces
due to variation in process.
A technique for obfuscated execution using reconfigurable chaos gate is developed. An
ALU circuit has been logic-locked by replacing some of the logic gates using the chaos
logic. The replacement locations are selected based on testability analysis. Optimal number
of chaos gates required for obtaining the desired level of obfuscation is found using the
replacement heuristic. The obfuscated circuit provides correct functionality when a correct
key is applied. Functionality obfuscation is evaluated in terms of hamming distance between
the circuit output corresponding to the correct and random key. This obfuscated computing
technique prevents unauthorized execution of micro instructions on a computing unit. The
optimal design provides a functionality obfuscation of nearly 48% hamming distance which
is very close to the desired level of obfuscation, 50%
Side channel security of the chaos based design obfuscation is evaluated against power
analysis based instruction reverse engineering attack.

Instructions are classified using

different classification algorithms on pre-generated power template. K nearest neighbor,
support vector machine and multivariate Gaussian, these 3 algorithms are used for
classification in this work. Best case instruction recognition rate is 36% for the chaos based
obfuscated design where the instructions based on static CMOS gates can be recognized with
an accuracy of as high as 94%.
A microarchitecture, MiniRISC-V is developed for a subset of RISC-V 32I instruction
set. Security enhancing modifications are performed by obfuscating the execution unit using
chaos gates. The RRAM based memory design with integrated tag generation protocol is
used as the data memory for the MiniRISC-V microarchitecture.
Additional logic is developed for facilitating load and store instruction with built in
integrity checking. New tag is generated from the data memory during store instructions
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and saved to the tag storage. Before each memory access, tag is regenerated on the existing
memory and compared with the previously stored tag. A status flag is used to show the
integrity status upon mismatch of the regenerated tag with the saved tag.
Various test programs have been developed in RISC-V assembly for executing on
MiniRISCV. Security properties are evaluated from the perspective of different security features of the processor designed in this work. Unauthorized code execution is evaluated using
various program behaviors such as output, control flow and memory trace, corresponding
to a valid key and few randomly generated keys. Resiliency toward side channel based
instruction classification attacks is tested by the recognition rate of the instructions used
in the test programs based on their power profiles. A DMA attack is modelled using the
MATLAB based custom emulator of the MinIRISC-V in order to test the success rate of
detecting unauthorized modifications in the memory.

6.2

Conclusions and Future Prospects

The embedded processor developed in this work addresses three significant inter-disciplinary
security issues by using emerging technologies in computing such as chaos logic and RRAM
memory. Inclusion of chaos logic basically locks the datapath of execution unit in order to
provide security against unauthorized code execution. The very same design can also be used
against power analysis based instruction classification attack. Resiliency to classification
attack leverages the amplified process variation of a chaotic evolution and large space of
functionality in chaos based logic gates. These properties of chaos based computation
provides efficient schemes for designing secure system against multiple attacks with a single
design technique. Besides the security of processing unit, the MiniRISC-V design also
provides security for the memory by integrating a RRAM with in-memory tag computation
capability. Integrity verification can be a part of each memory access in the MiniRISC-V with
significantly less computational resources as compared to other existing methods. Overall,
the MiniRISC-V design provides execution security, memory integrity and resiliency to side
channel attack.
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This work shows a great prospect of research in designing secure microarchitecture for
RISC-V as well as other ISA. Exploring the key management in both user and the privileged
mode of execution can be an exciting direction. Depending on the features of a particular
system, the options may have unique advantages over one another.
This work considers a single core processor and single process execution scenario for
studying various security vulnerabilities. Multi core and multi process execution brings
interesting security problems. Future works on supporting these features on the MiniRISCV in order to mitigate difficult security problems in an efficient and cost effective way. New
found vulnerabilities can be studied in order to mitigate them using the idea used in this
work with necessary architectural modifications.
The overhead of the chaos based logic is one of major concern in building larger systems.
Exploration of novel devices in order to build chaos logic would be a great direction in order
to reduce the overhead and make the chaos based computation more viable to be applied
in versatile and larger systems. Maximizing the reuse of each chaos logic for implementing
different logic operations would be a great way of fully utilizing the advantage of chaos.
Effort in this direction seems highly promising.
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A
A.1

RRAM Integrity Checking
RRAM Crossbar Matlab Model
% code for solving resistive crossbar array
function y=solver_shorted_row_column_crossbar(R1,R23,R4,Rload
,deln,VR)
%R1-Equivalent resistance of type1 cell
%R23-Summation of equivalent resistance of type 2 and type3
cell
%R4-Array of equivalent resistance of each selected column
%Rload-Load resistance
%deln-Tag bits i.e. No. of selected columns
%VR-Read voltage
mdel=zeros(2+deln,2+deln);
mdel(1,1)=1;
mdel(2,1)=-G23;
mdel(2,2)=G23+sum(G4);
mdel(2,3:end)=-G4;

for i=3:length(mdel)
for j=1:length(mdel)
if(j==1)
mdel(i,j)=-G1(i-2);
elseif (j==2)
mdel(i,j)=-G4(i-2);
elseif (j==i)
mdel(i,j)=G1(i-2)+G4(i-2)+Gload;
else
mdel(i,j)=0;
end
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end
end

Vright=zeros(2+deln,1);
Vright(1)=VR;
result=mdel\Vright;
y=result(3:end);

A.2

Uniformity Measurement

%Script for measuring uniformity of the generated tag
function prob_high=uniformity(m,n,deln,LOAD_nom)
% m=No. of row
% n=No. of column
% deln=No. of tag;
%LOAD_nom=ratio of load resistance and ON resistance

index=1:m*n;
R=zeros(m,n);

%% Analog to digital conversion
vmin=0;
vmax=.6;
nb=1; %ADC bits
nlev=2ˆnb;
res=(vmax-vmin)/nlev;
del=n/deln;% del-th no. of sampling column
w=1; % no. of reserved row combinations to be iterated
sprd=zeros(1,w);% spreadness vector

HRS=100e3;
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LRS=10e3;
Rload=LRS*LOAD_nom*ones(1,deln);
R_lrs=LRS*ones(m,n);
R_hrs=HRS*ones(m,n);
ind_Rload=1:deln;
k=1000;
y=zeros(k,deln);
z=zeros(k,nb*deln);
output=zeros(k,1);% final decimal equivalent of the binary load
voltage

for i=1:k
b_num=randi([0 1],m,n);
b_num(1,1:deln)=zeros(1,deln);
f0=find(b_num==0);
f1=find(b_num==1);
R(f0)=R_hrs(f0);
R(f1)=R_lrs(f1);
R1=R(1,1:deln);
R2=1/sum(1./R(1,deln+1:end));
R2p=1/sum(sum(1./R(2:end,deln+1:end)));
R23=R2+R2p;
R4=1./sum(1./R(2:end,1:deln));
y(i,:)=solver_shorted_row_column_crossbar(R1,R23,R4,LRS*
LOAD_nom,deln,vmax);

%analog to digital conversion of load voltage
for v=1:deln
z(i,(nb*(v-1)+1):(nb*v))=ADC(res,y(i,v),nb,vmin);
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end
output(i,1)=bin_to_dec(z(i,:));
end
prob_high=sum(z(:,1))/k
end

A.3

Diffusion Measurement

%Script for measuring diffusion of the tag distribution
function diff_coeff=diffusion(m,n,deln,LOAD_nom)
% m=No. of row
% n=No. of column
% deln=No. of tag;

index=1:m*n;
R=zeros(m,n);
%% Analog to digital conversion
vmin=0;
vmax=.6;
nb=1; %ADC bits
nlev=2ˆnb;
res=(vmax-vmin)/nlev;
del=n/deln;% del-th no. of sampling column
w=1; % no. of reserved row combinations to be iterated
sprd=zeros(1,w);% spreadness vector

HRS=300e3;
LRS=10e3;
LOAD=LRS/2;
Rload=LOAD*ones(1,deln);
R_lrs=LRS*ones(m,n);
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R_hrs=HRS*ones(m,n);

ind_Rload=1:deln;
k=1000;
y=zeros(k,deln);
HD=zeros(deln,k);
av_coeff=zeros(1,deln);
z1=zeros(1,nb*deln);
z2=zeros(1,nb*deln);
output=zeros(k,1);% final decimal equivalent of the binary load
voltage
b_num=zeros(m,n);
for i=1:k
b_num(1,:)=randi([0 1],1,n);
hw1=sum(b_num(1,:));
b_num(1,1:deln)=zeros(1,deln);
temp=randi([0 1],m-1,n);
size(temp);
b_num(2:end,:)=temp;
f0=find(b_num==0);
f1=find(b_num==1);
R(f0)=R_hrs(f0);
R(f1)=R_lrs(f1);
R1=R(1,1:deln);
R2=1/sum(1./R(1,deln+1:end));
R2p=1/sum(sum(1./R(2:end,deln+1:end)));
R23=R2+R2p;
R4=1./sum(1./R(2:end,1:deln));
y(i,:)=solver_shorted_row_column_crossbar(R1,R23,R4,LOAD,deln
,vmax);
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%analog to digital conversion of load voltage
for v=1:deln
z1(1,(nb*(v-1)+1):(nb*v))=ADC(res,y(i,v),nb,vmin);

end
b_num(1,:)=randi([0 1],1,n);
b_num(1,1:deln)=zeros(1,deln);
rw=randi([2 m],1,1);
cl=randi([1 n],1,1);
b_num(rw,cl)=mod((b_num(rw,cl)+1),2);
b_num;
b_num(2:end,:)=swap_column(b_num(2:end,:));
b_num;

f0=find(b_num==0);
f1=find(b_num==1);
R(f0)=R_hrs(f0);
R(f1)=R_lrs(f1);
R1=R(1,1:deln);
R2=1/sum(1./R(1,deln+1:end));
R2p=1/sum(sum(1./R(2:end,deln+1:end)));
R23=R2+R2p;
R4=1./sum(1./R(2:end,1:deln));
y(i,:)=solver_shorted_row_column_crossbar(R1,R23,R4,LOAD,deln
,vmax);
%analog to digital conversion of load voltage
for v=1:deln
z2(1,(nb*(v-1)+1):(nb*v))=ADC(res,y(i,v),nb,vmin);
end
for hh=1:deln
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HD(hh,i)=(mod((z2(hh)+z1(hh)),2));
end
end

for hh=1:deln
av_coeff(1,hh)=mean(HD(hh,:));
end
diff_coeff=geomean(av_coeff)
end

A.4

Avalanche measurement

%Script for measuring avalanche property of the tag distribution
function av_coeff=avalanche(m,n,deln)
% m=No. of row
% n=No. of column
% deln=No. of tag;
index=1:m*n;
R=zeros(m,n);
%% Analog to digital conversion
vmin=0;
vmax=.6;
nb=1; %ADC bits
nlev=2ˆnb;
res=(vmax-vmin)/nlev;
del=n/deln;% del-th no. of sampling column
w=1; % no. of reserved row combinations to be iterated
sprd=zeros(1,w);% spreadness vector
HRS=57e6;
LRS=58e3;
LOAD=LRS/2;
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Rload=LOAD*ones(1,deln);
R_lrs=LRS*ones(m,n);
R_hrs=HRS*ones(m,n);
ind_Rload=1:deln;
k=1000;
y=zeros(k,deln);
HD=zeros(1,k);
z1=zeros(1,nb*deln);
z2=zeros(1,nb*deln);
output=zeros(k,1);% final decimal equivalent of the binary load
voltage
b_num=zeros(m,n);
for i=1:k
b_num(1,:)=randi([0 1],1,n);
hw1=sum(b_num(1,:));
b_num(1,1:deln)=zeros(1,deln);
temp=randi([0 1],m-1,n);
size(temp);
b_num(2:end,:)=temp;
f0=find(b_num==0);
f1=find(b_num==1);
R(f0)=R_hrs(f0);
R(f1)=R_lrs(f1);
R1=R(1,1:deln);
R2=1/sum(1./R(1,deln+1:end));
R2p=1/sum(sum(1./R(2:end,deln+1:end)));
R23=R2+R2p;
R4=1./sum(1./R(2:end,1:deln));
y(i,:)=solver_shorted_row_column_crossbar(R1,R23,R4,LOAD,deln
,vmax);
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%analog to digital conversion of load voltage
for v=1:deln
z1(1,(nb*(v-1)+1):(nb*v))=ADC(res,y(i,v),nb,vmin);
end
b_num(1,:)=randi([0 1],1,n);
b_num(1,1:deln)=zeros(1,deln);
rw=randi([2 m],1,1);
cl=randi([1 n],1,1);
b_num(rw,cl)=mod((b_num(rw,cl)+1),2);
b_num(2:end,:)=swap_column(b_num(2:end,:));
f0=find(b_num==0);
f1=find(b_num==1);
R(f0)=R_hrs(f0);
R(f1)=R_lrs(f1);
R1=R(1,1:deln);
R2=1/sum(1./R(1,deln+1:end));
R2p=1/sum(sum(1./R(2:end,deln+1:end)));
R23=R2+R2p;
R4=1./sum(1./R(2:end,1:deln));
y(i,:)=solver_shorted_row_column_crossbar(R1,R23,R4,LOAD,deln
,vmax);
%analog to digital conversion of load voltage
for v=1:deln
z2(1,(nb*(v-1)+1):(nb*v))=ADC(res,y(i,v),nb,vmin);
end
HD(1,i)=sum(mod((z2+z1),2));
end
av_coeff=mean(HD(1,:))/deln
end
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B

Power Model

For faster simulation of side channel power analysis,power model for different type of
instructions has been developed. The main idea of this power model is to simulate the
basic circuit block of an instruction using transistor level circuit simulator for the delay and
instantaneous power estimation. Power traces are generated for that block for all possible
input transitions. The power traces along with the delay information of this block can be
used to estimate the overall power trace of an instruction since the same block is repeated
in the hardware for implementing the datapath of that instruction. The model for power
estimation in different types of instructions are explained as follows.

B.1

Logical Instruction

Single bit logic gates operate in parallel in order to implement the hardware of logical
instructions as shown in Fig. B.1. For a 32 bit logical instruction 32 copy of a logic gate
works. The overall power trace can be calculated by adding the power trace of the single bit
logic gate due to the corresponding input transitions.

Plogic =

n−1
X

P( ∆Ai , ∆Bi )

(B.1)

i=0

where P( ∆Ai , ∆Bi ) is the power trace of a single logic gate for an input transition, (Ai , ∆Bi ).

B.2

Arithmetic Instruction

Arithmetic instruction ADD and SUB are built using ripple carry adder where a full adder
circuit is repeated over the bit size of the instructions. A simple ripple carry adder is shown
in Fig. B.2. In each repetition, the carry out from the previous stage is propagated to the
current stage as the carry in. Clearly the basic building block for this type of instructions
are the full adder. The power traces for all possible input transition in a full adder circuit
is pre calculated using Spectre or any other transistor level circuit simulator. The power
trace for each stage due to their respective input transitions are added together in order to
estimate the overall power trace. However, unlike the logical instructions, the blocks operate
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Figure B.1: Hardware implementation of bit wise logical instruction.

Figure B.2: Hardware implementation of arithmetic instructions.
sequentially except for the initial time slot where all blocks operate on the operands A and B.
Later, only one block operates in each time slot once the previous one finishes operation on
the propagated carry in signal. The time slots are basically the delay required for calculating
the carry out by each full adder block. The delay of each block for all input transition is
estimated by the circuit simulator. Overall power consumption is contributed by the parallel
operations of all blocks at the first time slot and sequential operations of the blocks at later
slots. During the parallel operation, carry in signal, Ci remains constant while the signals,
Ai and Bi are constant during the sequential operations. Individual power traces separated
by their respective delay are added in order to estimate the overall power trace. This power
estimation can be expressed mathematically as follows:

Parith =

n−1
X
i=0

P(∆Ai ,∆Bi ,Ci ) +

n−1
X
i=1
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P(Ai ,Bi ,∆Ci ) u(t − di−1,i )

(B.2)

where P is power trace of each full adder block due to a transition in its inputs, Ai , Bi and
Ci ; d( i − 1, i) is the delay between two sequential operations and u is the unit step function.
Shift Instruction
Shift instructions are implemented using barrel shift circuit for this work. A conceptual
diagram of a barrel shifter circuit is shown in Fig. B.3. In this circuit, the basic building
block is a multiplexer. This circuit also operates in log2 n stage where each stage consists of n
number of multiplexer. Unlike the adder circuit, each block in a stage operates here in parallel
in order to generate results for the next stage. At the first time slot, all multiplexer blocks
operate on their new operands similar to the logical and arithmetic instructions. In later
time slots, n blocks from a particular stage operates in parallel on the propagated operands
from the previous stage. During these operations, the selector input of the multiplexer block
remains constant. The overall shift is performed by incremental shift operations in each
stage. The power model for this type instructions are combination of the models for logical
and arithmetic instructions. Power traces for each stage is estimated by simply adding the
corresponding block power for respective input transitions. Now, the overall power trace is
estimated by adding the power trace of each stage with a time delay. The mathematical
expression is as follows:
log2 n−1

Pshif t = Pinit +

Pinit =

n−1
X

X

n−1
X

i=1

j=0

!
P (∆Ai,j , f (∆Ai,j ), Bi ) u(t − d(i − 1, i))
log2 n−1

P (∆A0,j , f (∆A0,j ), ∆B0 ) +

j=0

X

n−1
X

i=1

j=0

!

(B.3)

P (Ai,j , f (Ai,j ), ∆Bi )

where P is the power trace of each multiplexer, d(i − 1, i) is the delay of a sequential
operation and u is the unit step function.
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Figure B.3: Conceptual diagram of barrel shifter used to implementation shift instructions.
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C

MiniRISC-V Assembler

import re
import sys

inputfile=sys.argv[1]
outputfile=sys.argv[2]
fw=open(outputfile,’w’)
fw.write(’memory_initialization_radix=16;\n’+’
memory_initialization_vector=\n’)
Rtype=[’add’,’sub’,’and’,’or’,’xor’,’sll’,’srl’,’sra’,’slt’]
Itype_1=[’addi’,’subi’,’andi’,’ori’,’xori’,’slli’,’srli’,’srai’,’
slti’]
Itype_2=[’lb’,’lh’,’lw’,’lbu’,’lhu’]
Stype=[’sb’,’sh’,’sw’]
Btype=[’beq’,’bne’,’blt’,’bge’,’bltu’,’bgeu’]
Call=[’jal’]
Ret=[’jalr’]
LUI=[’lui’]
KEY=[’shk’]

funct3={’add’:’000’,
’sub’:’000’,
’and’:’111’,
’or’ :’110’,
’xor’:’100’,
’sll’:’001’,
’srl’:’101’,
’sra’:’101’,
’slt’:’010’,
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’addi’:’000’,
’andi’:’111’,
’ori’ :’110’,
’xori’:’100’,
’slli’:’001’,
’srli’:’101’,
’srai’:’101’,
’slti’:’010’,
’beq’ :’000’,
’bne’ :’001’,
’blt’ :’100’,
’bge’ :’101’,
’bltu’:’110’,
’bgeu’:’111’,
’lb’

:’000’,

’lh’

:’001’,

’lw’

:’010’,

’lbu’ :’100’,
’lhu’ :’101’,
’sb’

:’000’,

’sh’

:’001’,

’sw’

:’010’}

ins_bin=’’
def line_num(phrase,inputfile):
with open(inputfile) as f:
count=0
for line in f:
count=count+1
if line==phrase:
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return count
a=line_num(’start:\n’,inputfile)

with open(inputfile) as f:
labeldict={}
count=0
for line in f:
count=count+1
line=line.strip(’\n’)
line=line.strip(’]’)
line=line.strip(’:’)
ins=re.split(’,|\[| ’,line)
if ins[0] not in Rtype+Itype_1+Itype_2+Stype+
Btype+Call+Ret+LUI+KEY:
labeldict[ins[0]]=count
count=count-1
print(labeldict)
with open(inputfile) as f:
lcount=0
truecount=0
for line in f:
lcount=lcount+1
truecount=truecount+1
line=line.strip(’\n’)
line=line.strip(’]’)
ins=re.split(’,|\[| ’,line)
flag=1
print(ins[0])
#opcode field
if

ins[0] in Rtype:
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opcode=’0110011’
rd=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
rs1=format(int(ins[2][1:]),’05b’)
rs2=format(int(ins[3][1:]),’05b’)
if (ins[0]==’sub’ or ins[0]==’sra’):
op30=’1’
else:
op30=’0’

ins_bin=’0’+op30+’00000’+rs2+rs1+funct3[
ins[0]]+rd+opcode

elif ins[0] in Itype_1:
opcode=’0010011’
rd=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
rs1=format(int(ins[2][1:]),’05b’)
imm=int(ins[3])
print(imm)
if imm<0:
imm=2**12+imm
imm=format(imm,’012b’)
print(imm)
ins_bin=imm+rs1+funct3[ins[0]]+rd+opcode
elif ins[0] in Itype_2:
opcode=’0000011’
rd=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
rs1=format(int(ins[2][1:]),’05b’)
imm=int(ins[3])
print(imm)
if imm<0:
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imm=2**12+imm
imm=format(imm,’012b’)
ins_bin=imm+rs1+funct3[ins[0]]+rd+opcode
elif ins[0] in Stype:
opcode=’0100011’
rs2=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
rs1=format(int(ins[2][1:]),’05b’)
imm=int(ins[3])
if imm<0:
imm=2**12+imm
imm=format(imm,’012b’)
ins_bin=imm[0:7]+rs2+rs1+funct3[ins[0]]+
imm[7:]+opcode
elif ins[0] in Btype:
opcode=’1100011’
rs1=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
rs2=format(int(ins[2][1:]),’05b’)
jump_label=ins[3]
print(jump_label)
line_jump=labeldict[jump_label]
imm=line_jump-truecount-1
imm=imm*2
if imm<0:
imm=2**12+imm
imm=format(imm,’012b’)
ins_bin=imm[0]+imm[2:8]+rs2+rs1+funct3[
ins[0]]+imm[8:]+imm[1]+opcode
print(ins_bin)
elif ins[0] in Call:
opcode=’1101111’
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rd=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
jump_label=ins[2]
line_jump=labeldict[jump_label]
print(line_jump)
print (truecount)
imm=line_jump-truecount-1
imm=imm*2
print(imm)
if imm<0:
imm=2**20+imm
imm=format(imm,’020b’)
ins_bin=imm[0]+imm[10:20]+imm[9]+imm
[1:9]+rd+opcode
elif ins[0] in Ret:
opcode=’1100111’
rd=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
rs1=format(int(ins[2][1:]),’05b’)
imm=format(int(ins[3]),’012b’)
ins_bin=imm+rs1+’000’+rd+opcode
elif ins[0] in LUI:
opcode=’0110111’
rd=format(int(ins[1][1:]),’05b’)
imm=(int(ins[2]))
print(imm)
if imm<0:
imm=2**20+imm
imm=format(imm,’020b’)
ins_bin=imm+rd+opcode
elif ins[0] in KEY:
opcode=’1111111’
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keysel=format(int(ins[1]),’03b’)
keyword=format(int(ins[2]),’016b’)
ins_bin=keyword+’000000’+keysel+opcode

else:
flag=0
truecount=truecount-1
if flag==1:
ins_bin_hex=format(int(ins_bin,2),’08x’)
fw.write(ins_bin_hex+’\n’)
print(ins_bin)
fw.write(’;’)
fw.close()
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